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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Ohio has a rich tradition in limiting the appreciation of tax valuation.  Beginning in 
the 1970’s, the Ohio General Assembly instituted a property tax limitation initiative 
popularly referred to as House Bill 920 to limit the growth in the taxable or assessed 
valuation of residential properties.  The success of Ohio’s tax limitation initiative was 
quickly mimicked by California (Proposition 13) in the 1970’s and Massachusetts 
(Proposition 2 1/2) in the early 1980’s.  Both were a part of a growing conservative 
movement that would sweep the country in the 1980’s and provide a foundation for the 
future “tax payers bill of rights” (TABOR) efforts of the 1990’s.  Today’s “tax expenditure 
limitation”  (TEL) dialogue in Ohio is the next chapter in the broader national movement.  
The proposed TEL is not limited to concerns about escalating property taxes, but has 
been expanded to all forms of taxation.  Like Colorado and Washington State, the 
recent TEL initiative in Ohio has broad implications on economic growth and on the 
ability of state and local governments to meet existing and future service needs. 
 
The operationalization of the TABOR and TEL initiatives in several states has 
brought with it several concerns.   In Colorado, the rapid economic growth of the early 
1990’s was met with a contrasting decline after the passage of the TABOR.  These 
concerns led to the suspension of the Colorado TABOR in 2005. In Washington State, 
Initiative 601 and the subsequent Initiative 747 have finely tuned the “ratcheting down” 
of state and local taxes and revenues.    
 
The success of these TABOR and TEL initiatives has brought Ohio back into the 
fray, with a TEL initiative sponsored by Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, 
attempting to join the November 2005 statewide ballot.  The strategic withdrawal of that 
TEL initiative from the fall ballot has fueled the emergence of at least one alternative to 
the initial TEL proposal, as well as concerns for Ohio’s future economic and fiscal 
stability. 
 
TABORs and TELs are generally the result of voter dissatisfaction with the 
perceived escalating cost of government and increases in tax payments. Many states 
have adopted TELs – through constitutional or statutory measures, ballot initiatives, or 
by legislative enactment – in an effort to stem increases in government spending. TELs 
generally tie annual spending limits to a combination of the inflation rate and the 
population growth rate, typically involve the disposition of surplus state revenue, and are 
used as mechanisms to cap the rate of increase in specific tax rates, most often 
property tax rates. To date, 27 states have some form of TEL in place. 
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Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell and Citizens for Tax Reform 
(CFTR) are championing a TEL that applies expenditure limits to all units of government 
and special districts in the state. Blackwell’s proposed TEL (Ohio TEL) amendment to 
Ohio’s constitution ties annual spending limits to one of two formulas: The expenditure 
limit can be increased by the combination of the inflation rate and population growth rate 
or by a 3.5 percent increase in governmental expenditures, whichever is larger. An 
alternative TEL model has been advanced by Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro, 
proposing a limitation measure through the Citizens’ Amendment for Prosperity (Ohio 
CAP). The Ohio CAP proposal would cap taxes at 5.5 percent of the total business and 
personal income earned in the state, thus limiting state revenues to a fixed percentage 
annually and state revenue growth would be tied to growth in business and personal 
income. 
 
 Ohio was one of the first states to implement tax expenditure limitations as a 
relief measure for accelerating property tax rates due to high levels of inflation in the 
1970s. Homeowners voiced their displeasure and pressured the government for some 
form of tax relief, and Ohio lawmakers responded with the passage of House Bill 920. 
House Bill 920 restricts property tax growth by preventing increases in tax receipts 
through inflation, and fixes the dollar amount of revenue that can be raised through 
property tax levies. Voters made it part of the state constitution in 1980.  
 
While HB 920 has nearly universal support from the Ohio public, it has yielded 
some unintended consequences for Ohio’s public schools. First, local taxing districts—
especially school districts—are frequently before the voters campaigning for either 
renewal levies or increased operating levies to maintain operations. This leads to voter 
fatigue, and puts the school district leadership in a constant campaign mode.  Second, 
voters who want to vote against their total tax burden only have a chance to express 
their sentiment through their votes on local property taxes, and the schools suffer 
disproportionately.  Third, the state’s school funding formula accounts for the current 
assessed value as if it is yielding property tax revenue without the constraints of HB 
920.  This means that districts with rapidly rising property values or with a great deal of 
new, high-value development are penalized in their state school funding.  
 
 The states of Colorado, Washington, and Michigan are among the 27 states that 
currently have TELs in place. Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) is the most 
stringent of the tax and expenditure limits, and is similar in structure to Ohio TEL 
proposal. Washington, like Colorado, uses a formula of population plus inflation growth 
to determine growth in state spending. Michigan, unlike Colorado and Washington, uses 
a revenue-limiting mechanism based on personal income. Michigan underwent major 
fiscal changes in the mid-1990s as a result of the adoption of Proposal A, which shifted  
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the K-12 grade educational funding burden from property taxes to a mixed tax collection  
system that emphasizes state sales tax revenue. A similar situation could occur in Ohio.  
Michigan ‘s law is also the model for Ohio CAP proposal.  The CAP proposal was 
designed after the Headlee Amendment in Michigan, but it places tighter restraints on 
the total amount of revenue the state can collect. Where Michigan caps revenues at 
9.49 percent, the CAP places a 5.5 percent restriction on revenues. 
 
Although similar to the Colorado TABOR, the Ohio TEL proposal differs in 
several respects.  Following a few recessionary years, Colorado saw its budgets 
decimated, with the effects of those cuts continuing for years due to the structure of the 
expenditure cap. However, under the Ohio TEL proposal, Ohio would: 
 
• Guarantee maximum spending increases of 3.5 percent per year 
• Safeguard unspent revenues. Any unspent revenue up to 15 percent over 
the budget is placed in a budget reserve fund (rainy day fund), and once 
the fund exceeds 15 percent of the budget, the surplus is refunded to the 
taxpayers (thereby fixing a second of TABOR’s flaws)  
 
The Ohio TEL proposal also departs from Colorado’s TABOR in that 
accommodations are made for any subsequent constitutional amendments. When the 
state of Colorado passed a mandatory spending amendment for K-12 education, it 
affected the entire state budget. If there are any constitutionally mandated spending 
increases introduced into Ohio’s fiscal arena, the Ohio TEL would be made null and 
void. The proposed Ohio TEL does not limit revenue collections and excludes all 
Medicaid funding, federal funds, tax relief—such as the 10 percent Homestead property 
tax rollback, and any other non-General Revenue Fund monies. The Ohio TEL appears 
to focus on the remaining portion of the state’s General Revenue Fund budget. 
 
Although the Ohio TEL is more carefully designed than its predecessors, the 
potential for ratcheting down spending remains. While the CFTR was prudent in 
inserting a provision that reduces the potential for an actual decline in expenditures with 
the alternative 3.5 percent cap on expenditure increases, the proposal does not account 
for severe downturns in the business cycle and the accompanying reduction in revenue. 
Any real reduction in the revenue stream will be associated with ratcheting down state 
spending accompanied by budget cuts and a constitutionally mandated delay in bringing 
the budget back to its previous size.  
 
 In Ohio, there are a number of structural concerns about the Ohio TEL proposal 
in particular.  First, the proposal will introduce a great deal of fiscal uncertainty at the 
local level and increase the complexity and unpredictability of local finance, especially of  
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school finance.  The state is transitioning from the Tangible Personal Property Tax to  
the Commercial Activity Tax (CAT).  This transition removes an important source of  
revenue from local school finances and the legislature will have to channel CAT 
collections to the schools by formula.  While this change in the state’s tax structure is  
important for the future development of the state’s economy, the full impact of this 
structural change on local school districts is not known with certainty.  At the same time, 
House Bill 920 remains in effect keeping local school districts leashed to the ballot box 
through renewal levies.  Adding a TEL to these two new challenges to managing school 
districts is unwise and the interaction of the Ohio TEL proposal amendment with HB 920 
could lead to a downward ratchet effect in K-12 education spending. 
 
Second, there are three drafting or definitional issues regarding the Ohio TEL 
proposal that are unsettling.  (1) The portion of the state budget that is covered by the 
Ohio TEL is not clearly defined.  (2) The proposed amendment requires a majority of 
“electors” to approve spending above the Ohio TEL cap for all sub-state units of 
government.  An elector appears to be an enrolled voter not those who vote in an 
election.  (3) The proposal includes all “instrumentalities” of the state in the coverage of 
the TEL at the state level. Ohio law defines any board, commission, authority, public 
corporation, college, university, or other educational institution, or any other entity 
supported in whole or in part by funds appropriated by the general assembly, as an 
instrumentality of the state. This means that the state’s budget would have to include 
the budgets of all of these special purpose state-supported enterprises. These 
institutions would lose their budget independence, their revenues could become part of 
the state’s general revenue fund, and the fiduciary responsibilities of their boards 
become unclear. 
 
Third, the Ohio TEL proposal appears to cover all units of governments and 
special districts with taxing authority.  The ability of these units to tax in order to pay off 
general obligation bond issues will be limited, thereby hindering the ability of local and 
regional governmental units to respond to federal and court mandates.  Regional and 
local governments will also be limited in their ability to invest in their own economic 
futures through community colleges and port authorities.  Regions will also be limited in 
their ability to invest in amenities such as parks and zoos. 
 
Fourth, the TEL will increase the risk of default on the part of all local 
governments and those special purpose state-supported enterprises that are 
determined to be instrumentalities of the state. This includes school districts, 
universities, and community colleges, as well as sewer and water authorities and park 
districts. The uncertainty of the impacts of the proposed amendment will increase public 
borrowing costs. 
 A Review of Tax Expenditure Limitations 
and their Impact on State & Local Government in Ohio 
 
 
 
The Center for Public Management   9
 
We do not believe that the proposed amendment was intended to affect units of 
government that operate enterprise funds such as the Turnpike Authority or universities, 
with the exception of the subsidy that they receive from the state budget.  However, the 
uncertainty about the impact of the Ohio TEL on what can be interpreted as fees and 
sales, such as tuition payments, tolls, and even sales at hospitals run by state 
universities gives rise to the two most unsettling and potentially fiscally irresponsible 
features of the proposed amendment – the supremacy clause and the incentive 
advocacy groups will have to sue state and local governments over the interpretation 
and implementation of the Ohio TEL.  
 
The proposed Ohio TEL contains a supremacy clause, making the provisions of 
the amendment superior to other existing laws and constitutional provisions.  This is 
public policymaking with blinders and does not allow either the voters or the legislature 
to sort out conflicting statutes with consideration.  The uncertainty that is injected into 
the policymaking process by the supremacy clause is compounded by the amendment’s  
language that invites lawsuits against all levels of government and special districts in  
the state of Ohio over the implementation of the amendment.  The fact that individuals 
and groups can sue the state over the amendment’s implementation and collect fees if  
they win while state and sub-state governmental units cannot even recover their costs 
of successfully defending themselves unless the suit is declared to be frivolous, is an 
irresponsible invitation to jam the courts with fee-hungry advocates and legal 
opportunists. 
 
Legalistic approaches to imposing tax and expenditure limitations pose a number 
of administrative challenges to the operation of state and local government.  However, 
in our view this is not the most damaging prospect of either of the two proposed TEL 
amendments to Ohio’s constitution.  The largest threat is to the concept of 
representative democracy.  Representative William Seitz wrote in his letter to the Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce that the Ohio TEL proposal is anti-republican.  Seitz, writing on 
behalf of the Hamilton County delegation to the Ohio state legislature, stated that the 
proposed Ohio TEL “is unnecessary and potentially harmful constitutional gimmickry 
that emasculates the core legislative role of determining tax and budget policy.”  We 
agree.  The Ohio TEL proposal is anti-republican and constitutes a radical affront to 
representative democracy.  The amendment is fundamentally different from the 
constitutional requirement that state and local governments must have balanced 
budgets.  That requirement is one of fiscal prudence.  The Ohio TEL proposal is an 
assault on the concept of local government home rule and it is a restraint on the ability 
of government to respond to the public’s collective investment and collective 
consumption/wishes.   
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The Ohio TEL proposal also would defeat a basic test of economic efficiency 
because it prevents local voters from tailoring packages of services and tax rates to 
meet their consumption preferences. The TEL would lead to a leveling of the tax-service 
offerings of local government.  Economic theory and over two centuries of governmental 
practice in the United States demonstrates the allocative efficiency of having a number 
of competing local governments try to match the spending and tax-paying desires of 
individuals.  It is desirable to have some units of local government that are tax-high 
service districts and have others at the other end of the spectrum.  State government 
should intervene with a light hand when it comes to home rule spending decisions once 
constitutional mandated levels of service provisions are met.   
 
The Secretary of State has dual and competing roles as both the sponsor of this 
ballot issue and as the Chief Elections Officer of the state of Ohio.  His role as the 
initiator of the TEL Amendment should not prevent the Secretary acting in his role as 
the state’s Chief Elections Officer and in acting on behalf of the citizens of Ohio.  In his 
current capacity as Secretary of State there is a responsibility to clarify the ballot 
language that would allow Ohio’s voters/electors to understand the intent and 
implication of the constitutional ballot issue.  This has not been done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the mid-1970s, many states have adopted tax or government expenditure 
limitations in an effort to slow or reverse increases in government spending.  These 
limitations or TELs vary a great deal. They are either statutory or constitutional 
measures; some have been enacted through the initiative and petition referendum 
process, while others have been enacted by legislatures.  Some limit tax collections; 
others govern expenditure growth, and a few do both. Some apply solely to state 
revenue sources, while others affect both state and local tax revenues.  
 
In this paper, we examine the history, structure, and fiscal impact of TEL 
legislation.  We do this to inform the debate that will take place in Ohio between now 
and the election of November 2006 about an expenditure limitation measure that has 
been initiated by Ohio’s Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell, working with Citizens for 
Tax Reform (CFTR).    
 
This report examines the history of TELs across the United States from their 
infancy in the mid-1970s through their current incarnation.  Various TELs are reviewed, 
the forces behind their creation are discussed, and three case studies of the 
performance of TELs are presented, examining their structures and outcomes.  In the 
first portion of the paper, we provide an overview of different forms of TELs and the 
economic pressures that led to their enactment.  The second part of the paper provides 
the history of the TEL movement.  In the third section, case studies of the performance 
of TELs in Colorado, Washington, and Michigan are presented.  The fourth section is 
specific to Ohio.  The history of tax limitation efforts in Ohio is discussed.  This is 
followed by a description of the Ohio TEL proposal and the initial reaction to that 
proposal.  The forces that have driven spending increases in Ohio are also examined in 
this section, with a discussion of how the Ohio TEL proposal would have influenced 
spending if it were enacted in 1996, and how the Ohio TEL proposal can affect future 
spending. 
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TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
The first modern limit on taxation in the United States was made into law in Ohio 
in 1976 with the passage of House Bill 920.  This bill effectively froze the amount of 
property taxes that state and local government could collect.  House Bill 920 was 
crafted as a legislative remedy for rapidly increasing property taxes triggered by the 
intense inflation experienced from the mid-1970s to 1980.  Ohio’s voters made the law 
part of the state’s constitution in 1980.  In 1978, interest in tax limitation laws grew 
nationally with the passage of Proposition 13 in California.  The popular support for 
Proposition 13 was again triggered by rapidly increasing land values; the proposition 
capped property tax collections.  The same was evident in Massachusetts in 1980 when 
that state imported the concepts behind Proposition 13 and voted in its own property tax 
limitation measure, Proposition 2 1/2.  In 1978, Michigan’s legislature evolved the 
concept by moving beyond a property tax limit and approving a comprehensive tax limit.  
The next stage in the evolution of TELs took place in Colorado, where voters passed 
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) in 1992, which is both a tax and an expenditure 
limitation measure.  TABOR limited increases in Colorado’s state spending to the 
previous year’s spending plus the combination of the inflation rate and the population 
growth rate.  To date, 27 states have some form of TEL in place. 
 
What drives the creation of TELs? 
  
Tax and expenditure limitations are generally the result of voter dissatisfaction 
with the cost of state government. The public finance environment has experienced two 
discernible waves of tax limitation efforts, the late 1970s and the early to mid 1990s. In 
both eras, dynamic individuals dedicated to reducing the size of state government led 
citizen tax revolt efforts. While Ohio’s H.B. 920 and Proposition 13 sought specifically to 
ease the property tax burden on citizens, they ushered in a new period in public finance 
– the citizen initiated tax revolt. The second wave of TELs that began in the early 1990s 
was no different. At the time, many states were experiencing a recession while state tax 
collections continued to rise. This contradictory dynamic created environments in which 
voters supported limitations on government growth and spending. 
 
How do TELs work? 
   
In general, tax and expenditure limitations have three main components. The first 
component is a spending limit.  TELs typically tie annual spending limits to a 
combination of the inflation rate and the population growth rate. While TELs are the 
most common form of state spending limitation, three other limiting methods are also  
 A Review of Tax Expenditure Limitations 
and their Impact on State & Local Government in Ohio 
 
 
 
The Center for Public Management   14
 
employed: (1) limit growth to some percentage of current general fund receipts, (2) limit  
spending growth to the same rate as personal income growth, or (3) limit growth in 
projected revenues. The second component of the legislation typically involves the 
disposition of surplus state revenue.  In some cases unspent money, up to a designated 
percentage, is placed in a budget stabilization or rainy day fund. In the event that the 
state exceeds the predetermined percentage dedicated to the budget stabilization fund, 
the taxpayers of the state would enjoy a refund. However, in the case of Colorado’s 
TABOR, all unspent money is automatically refunded to taxpayers in the next budget 
year. The third component is a mechanism to adjust tax rates.  TELs oftentimes require 
voter approval for any new taxes, tax increases, or changes in the tax structure.  
 
Types of TELs 
  
There are three broad categories of TELs: tax/revenue limits, expenditure limits, 
and revenue and expenditure limits. Currently, there are five revenue limitations in place 
that tie revenue growth either to the previous years’ collections, revenue estimates, or 
growth in personal income. Any revenues collected above this amount are either placed 
in a budget stabilization fund or are refunded to the taxpayers. The most common type 
of restriction is an expenditure limitation. As of this publication, there were 30 
expenditure or revenue limitations in place, with many states employing more than one 
restriction. Expenditure limitations are oftentimes tied to the combined annual growth in 
population and inflation, growth in personal income, or the size of the previous year’s 
budget. While these limitations predominate, several states have “appropriations to 
revenue” limits. These limitations restrict actual appropriations to a percentage of 
projected revenues. Finally, there are two states, Colorado and Washington that have a 
combination of revenue and expenditure limitations. These two states have garnered 
considerable attention, primarily due to their rigid budgetary environments. In both 
cases, spending is tied to growth in population plus inflation; what makes these states 
different is that Colorado provides immediate refunds to taxpayers with surplus revenue, 
while Washington places the surplus in a budget stabilization fund. Colorado and 
Washington are also noteworthy because the Blackwell TEL proposal is a derivative of 
these two efforts.   The Petro CAP expenditure limitation proposal is a variant of 
Michigan’s law. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF TELS 
 
California’s Proposition 13 
 
Popular interest in state tax and expenditure limits was stimulated by the anti-
property tax campaign spearheaded by Californian Howard Jarvis in 1978. Jarvis 
captured populist anti-tax sentiment with his cry of “I’m mad as hell and I won’t take it 
any more.”1 Jarvis’ Proposition 13 grabbed the attention of California voters and the 
national press.  He argued that he was defending hardworking Californians who could 
no longer afford their property tax payments and led a very public campaign. 
Proposition 13 passed by a nearly two-thirds majority. The act slashed property taxes 
by 57 percent, by limiting property tax rates to one percent of assessed value. Property 
assessment increases are limited to two percent annually.2 When a house or 
commercial property is sold a new tax value is established using the sales price as the 
valuation.  The property tax is then limited to one percent of the property’s new value 
and annual increases in property taxes are limited by restricting annual increases is the 
assessed valuation to two percent per year.  Proposition 13 shifts the property tax 
burden to new owners and away from long-time property owners.  Proposition 13 was 
critical in convincing the residents of other states to adopt their own revenue-limiting 
measures. 
 
Ohio House Bill 920 
 
The voters of Ohio anticipated California’s property tax revolt by two years. 
During the mid 1970s and early 1980s the state experienced both high levels of inflation 
and its own tax revolt. Ohio’s House Bill 920 was enacted into law in 1976. An initiative 
petition moved to make HB 920 part of the state’s constitution as a pre-emptive move to 
thwart a public campaign similar to that enacted in California.  
 
House Bill 920 effectively limited the growth of local voter-approved real property 
taxes by prohibiting any unvoted tax increases in real property revenue. HB 920 
restricts property tax growth by preventing increases in tax receipts through inflation. 
The law fixes the dollar amount of revenue that a property tax levy can raise, not the tax 
rate, also known as the number of mills.  If the tax base (property value) increases due 
to either inflation or demand pressure then the tax rate (the number of mills or millage) 
is reduced to keep the dollar yield from the assessed tax constant.  The effect of HB  
                                            
1 Jarvis, H. (1985).  
2 Sears, D. and Citrin, J. (1985).  
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920 has been dramatic on local school districts.  As school expenses rise, either in  
response to increased enrollment, state or federal mandates, or new capital or 
operating costs, educators must work with revenues that are at best stagnant, or they 
may decline in terms of their purchasing power due to inflation.  Because the property 
tax serves as the chief revenue source for local school districts and because these tax 
revenues are not permitted to increase with inflation, school districts must continuously 
place levies before the voters in order to maintain performance and operations.3 
Requiring voter approval for any increase in real property tax has hamstrung school 
finance and led to an inundation of local tax levies on the ballot.  
 
History of TELs 
 
Following the success of Proposition 13, several other states began 
implementing tax revenue-limiting mechanisms. Between 1970 and 1980, more than a 
dozen states enacted some type of property tax or levy issuing limitation. In the state of 
Michigan, residents passed the Headlee Amendment, an initiative-driven constitutional 
amendment that limits revenue collections to 9.49 percent of personal income annually. 
Revenue collections that exceed 9.49 percent by less than one percent are deposited 
into a rainy day fund, while any revenue collections greater than one percent over the 
9.49 percent must be refunded to the taxpayers. The amendment received its name 
from supporter Richard Headlee, who at the time served as CEO of Alexander Hamilton 
Life Insurance Company. The Headlee Amendment was a major evolutionary step in 
the development of TEL legislation because it specifically limited total revenue 
collections through a constitutional amendment. Earlier efforts just restricted property 
tax collections legislatively.   
 
The tax revolt turned into a prairie fire, stimulating residents throughout the 
nation to evaluate their state’s taxing and revenue structures. As early as 1978, Hawaii 
and Arizona approved constitutional mandates to limit the expenditures of state 
government.  Arizona and Hawaii enacted true TELs by passing revenue restrictions in 
favor of expenditure limitations. Over the next decade, 14 states would implement some 
form of expenditure limiting amendment or statute.4  
 
Nine states followed Arizona and Hawaii’s lead in adopting expenditure  
limits before 1986. Only two states enacted constitutional revenue limitations in the  
                                            
3 WVIZ. "The Legacy of House Bill 920: How it has affected school funding." WCPN 90.3 FM, Cleveland. 
12 September 2000. Broadcast. 13 Oct 2005; and WVIZ. “School levies aim to fund better education”. 
WCPN 90.3 FM, Cleveland. 1May 2001 Broadcast. 30 September 2005.  
4 Rafool, M. (2005).  
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same period. A majority of the TELs implemented between 1976 and 1986 used  
expenditure-limiting formulas based on a combination of personal income and 
population growth moving away from inflationary adjustments to limits.  
 
Though difficult to quantify, other factors must be given consideration when trying 
to analyze the shift in limits from revenues to expenditures.  For instance, voter polls 
taken in California and in the nation showed that citizens were unsatisfied with the level 
of taxation in states and the nation, despite the enactment of tax limits. Others have 
suggested that expenditure limits still allowed for the formation of a rainy day or reserve 
fund, while a revenue limit may take away that possibility. Mandy Rafool, author of State 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations, suggests that expenditure limitations are chosen over 
revenue limitations because, “expenditure limits curb state appropriations and generally 
are not as restrictive as revenue limits because it is easier for states to control spending 
levels than to anticipate incoming revenues accurately.”5  William Dougan considers an 
additional factor when he states, “Legislators or citizens…might easily find that a limit on 
total appropriations is preferable to setting an arbitrary limit on the budget of each 
bureau.  Under a restriction on total new appreciations, each bureau competes with 
other bureaus for additional funds, so that the incentives to produce information about 
the demand for the services provided are not as attenuated as in the case of a fixed 
amount of spending per bureau.”6 
 
The early 1990s witnessed resurgence in grassroots efforts to enact TELs in the 
American states, with 10 new limitations enacted between 1990 and 2005. Scholars 
have offered various explanations regarding the source of the tax revolt revival. Poulson 
contends that the recession of the early 1990s generated renewed interest in limiting 
government growth and helped usher in a new wave of TELs. He points to two other 
specific developments that stimulated interest in tax limitations: a discrepancy in the 
long-term rates of growth in state revenues versus the growth of spending in states and 
the differing responses of state governments to the revenue shortfalls that 
corresponded with economic recessions.7 Mullins offers a similar assessment, indicating 
that growth in property taxes and the local government’s share of the state and local 
sector is the key factor in the passage of a TEL. Mullins concludes that voters in states 
with TELs became increasingly frustrated with the size and proportion of government 
spending in relation to the overall economy.8 While Poulson and Mullins tie the 
resurgence and success of TELs to the broader economic conditions present in  
                                            
5 Rafool, M. (2005).  
6 Dougan, W. (1988).  
7 Poulson, B.D. (2004).  
8 Mullins, D. (2004).  
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American states, New, Stansel, and Johnson place significant emphasis on voter 
participation, asserting that direct democracy through the initiative process and voter  
dissatisfaction was on the rise in the early 1990s. New contends that direct democracy 
was expanding, pointing to the fact that voter initiatives in California grew from six in the 
1960s to 62 during the 1990s. He cited the 1996 general election as an example. During 
the 1996 election, American voters encountered more than 90 statewide initiatives and 
an estimated 200 local initiatives or referenda.9 Stansel suggests that the tax revolt 
returned in the 1990s as a broad-based political movement. He notes that between 
1992 and 1994 five states enacted tax and/or spending limitations. Stansel further 
contends that the tax revolt of the early 1990s closely mirrored that of the 1970s, 
pointing to grassroots taxpayer sentiments that state governments had grown too 
large.10  
 
Johnson, reviewing Colorado’s TABOR amendment, reached a similar 
conclusion. He suggests that the American electorate in 1992 and 1994 was swelling 
with anti-tax, anti-government sentiments. Johnson supports these contentions by 
pointing to the turnover in the United States Congress in 1994 that was based in large 
part on promises of lower taxation, regulation, and government spending.11 While there 
exists a diversity of hypotheses as to the root causes of the TEL resurgence, it is clear 
that the 1990s ushered in a new wave of tax limitation efforts across the American 
states. 
 
The types of TELs implemented in the 1990s differ from the earlier wave of 
legislation. More recent TELs focus on limiting future state taxing and/or spending rather 
than reducing the existing tax burden. This new wave of TELs does this by establishing 
a base expenditure or revenue figure and then tying any future revenue or spending  
growth to specific factors, such as population growth, growth in personal income, or 
inflation. Beginning in 1990 and 1991, expenditure limitations began showing up 
throughout the United States. Colorado, Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina 
enacted statutory spending limitations. In each case government spending was tied to 
growth in personal income. The current flavor of TEL was invented and initially 
popularized in 1992 with Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR). Colorado, 
Washington, Florida, Missouri, Louisiana, and Connecticut passed constitutional 
amendments limiting revenue growth, spending growth, or both. 
 
                                            
9 New, M. (2003).  
10 Stansel, D. (1994).  
11 Johnson, D. (2004).  
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The Role of the Policy Entrepreneur 
 
 In many cases, tax and expenditure limitations have been promoted and  
advanced by a single wealthy or influential individual dedicated to the passage of 
restrictions on the scope of government. John Kingdon, in his work Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies advanced the notion of “policy entrepreneurs” or policy 
drivers into the public policy arena. A policy entrepreneur is an individual who has an 
interest in developing and promoting a new public policy. This individual oftentimes 
presents alternatives that stray from conventional policy. Further, these individuals 
recognize an opening or “window of opportunity” and utilize this situation to present their 
own unique policy perspective or solution. In each case study presented later in this 
report, a policy entrepreneur was instrumental in the advancement and implementation 
of a limitation.12  
 
 The development and evolution of tax and expenditure limitations in the 
American states can be traced to several prominent individuals dedicated to the notion 
of limited government. Arguably the first tax limitation entrepreneur was Ohio’s George 
Voinovich. In 1976 George Voinovich, then Cuyahoga County Auditor, was concerned 
with rising property taxes. Voinovich recognized that rapid inflation was leading to high 
residential property taxes and voter unrest. In an attempt to ease the burden of property 
taxes, especially on seniors, Voinovich guided legislation through the Ohio House (H.B. 
920) that limited the growth of local property taxes.13  
 
 The anti-tax sentiment continued to build nationally through the late 1970s with 
Howard Jarvis in California. Jarvis was successful in capturing the attention of both 
California’s voters and the national media. His Proposition 13 was approved by nearly 
two-thirds of California voters and spawned a larger tax revolt movement throughout the 
United States. Jarvis was an expert at gauging citizen sentiment and successfully 
utilized public opinion to further his policy agenda.  
 
 Much like the state of California, Michigan realized a shift in public finance policy 
due in large part to the efforts of one dedicated individual, Richard Headlee, the 
Chairman of Taxpayers United for Tax Limitation, who advocated limiting tax increases 
on the residents of the state. Headlee packaged his policy as a means of managing 
public money more efficiently and equitably. Headlee was successful in shepherding an  
 
                                            
12 Kingdon, J.  
13 WVIZ. "The Legacy of House Bill 920: How it has affected school funding." WCPN 90.3 FM, Cleveland. 
12 September 2000. Broadcast. 13 Oct 2005 
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amendment (appropriately named the Headlee Amendment) through the state  
legislature that restricted the growth in state revenues in 1978.  
 
 The state of Colorado enacted its TABOR in 1992 under the leadership of 
California-transplant Douglas Bruce. Bruce’s efforts provide insight into the three-part 
formula to enact radical public policy change: an articulate policy entrepreneur who has 
staying power, enough money to run numerous campaigns, and a policy window. Bruce 
began advocating for tax and spending limitations around 1988, but it was not until the 
“window of opportunity” presented itself, with the combination of an economic downturn, 
putting income pressures on voters coupled with an organized campaign; then Bruce 
seized the opportunity to introduce his form of fiscal restraint to Colorado’s voters. 
 
 Currently, Tim Eyman is a dedicated anti-tax policy entrepreneur working in the 
state of Washington to enact legislation requiring state and local performance audits. 
Eyman views these audits as conduits to more open and efficient government spending. 
In Ohio, Secretary of State Ken Blackwell has taken the lead in promoting a TEL as a 
vehicle for enforcing fiscal restraint. Blackwell has garnered considerable local and 
national attention for his commitment to lower taxes. Like the entrepreneurs who came 
before Eyman and Blackwell, both see an opportunity to advance their policy objectives 
through a popular mandate. Policy entrepreneurs, when they are skilled politically, 
engaging, and thoughtful, have enjoyed marked success in selling their policy 
innovations in the policy arena.  
 
TEL: A Historical Timeline14 
 
The starting point of the legislative timeline is set as 1971.  The table below 
(Table 1) includes not only TELs, but also includes other major state tax cuts that 
indicate voter restiveness with state and local taxing. 
                                            
14 Rafool, M. (2005); and Preston, A. and Ichniowski, C. (2001).  
 A Review of Tax Expenditure Limitations 
and their Impact on State & Local Government in Ohio 
 
 
 
The Center for Public Management   21
Table 1 
Tax Expenditure Limitations: A Historical Timeline 
19
71
 Washington state passes a constitutional amendment restricting property tax to one 
percent of fair market value. State legislators increase assessments for 50 percent to 
100 percent of market value. 
 
North Dakota lowers sales tax rates from four percent to three percent. 
19
76
 
 
Ohio passes HB 920 (it becomes a constitutional amendment in 1980) and limits 
property tax increases.  
 
California passes Proposition 13, lowering property taxes to one percent of the 
purchase price until the property is resold and reducing the property tax burden by 
nearly 53 percent.  This sets off a nationwide reassessment of state taxing structures.  
 
Arizona enacts a TEL with a constitutional amendment that allows for growth of up to 
7.23 percent in government spending each year. 
 
Delaware residents pass a TEL that limits appropriations to 98 percent of state 
revenues.  
 
Hawaii enacts a TEL that limits increases in state spending to the percentage of state 
growth.   
 
Illinois passes a TEL that limits state spending allowances. 
 
Michigan voters approve the 1978 Tax Limitation Amendment, otherwise known as the 
Headlee Amendment.   This TEL allows state spending growth to rise with population 
plus the rate of inflation and also restricts revenue collection to 9.49 percent of annual 
personal income in Michigan. 
 
North Dakota voters vote to decrease personal income taxes and increase corporate 
income taxes.  
19
78
 
 
Nevada residents pass a bill limiting property tax rates, though due to a requirement for 
constitutional revisions to be passed by voters in two separate elections, the act later fail 
in 1980.  
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South Dakota residents require a two-thirds legislative majority before tax spending can 
be increased.  
 
Texas residents approve a TEL via a constitutional amendment that limits spending to 
the rate of state personal income growth. 
19
78
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
 
Tennessee voters approve a TEL through a constitutional referendum that limits state 
appropriations to state personal income growth.  
 
California residents pass a TEL using a constitutional amendment that limits annual 
state appropriations to personal income growth plus population increases.  
19
79
 
 
Washington State passes Initiative 62 that revises the 1971 property tax limit. Total 
state and local property tax collections are restricted to six percent of fair market value. 
 
The election of Ronald Reagan as president is seen by some as a sign of  
increasingly tax-reluctant citizens throughout the country. 
 
Idaho voters pass a TEL through a state statute that limits increases in state 
appropriations to 5.33 percent of state personal income.  
 
Massachusetts’ voters adopt proposition 2 ½, limiting state property tax increases to 2.5 
percent annually. 
 
Missouri voters pass a constitutional TEL that limits revenue increases to 5.64 percent 
of the prior year’s personal income.  
 
Ohio House Bill 920 is adopted as a constitutional amendment.  
 
19
80
 
South Carolina approves a constitutional TEL that limits state spending increases to 
personal income growth or 9.5 percent of state personal income in the previous year, 
whichever is higher.  
 
19
81
 
Montana adopts a TEL through a state statute limiting state spending increases to a 
percentage of state personal income growth. 
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Alaska voters approve a constitutional TEL that limits state spending increases to 
population plus inflation. 
Colorado voters pass the Gallagher Amendment, which states that 45 percent of state 
property tax revenues must come from residential property and 55 percent must come 
from commercial property. 1
98
2 
West Virginia voters require a property tax reassessment that limits assessments to 60 
percent of the market value. 
19
85
 Oklahoma passes a constitutional TEL that limits spending increases to 12 percent of 
annual growth and limits appropriations to 95% of revenues.  
 
California voters require voter approval for any local property tax increases.  
 
A Massachusetts TEL is passed through a state statute that limits revenue collections to 
the average increase in state wage growth for the previous three years.  
 
Oregon freezes property tax rates at the 1986 level.  
 
19
86
 
Utah limits property tax rates to 2.4 mills. 
 
19
89
 
Utah passes a TEL via state statute that limits state spending increases to population 
plus inflation.  
Oregon enacts several property tax rates to between .5 and 1.5 percent, depending on 
the intended usage.  
19
90
 
New Jersey enacts a statutory TEL that limits state spending increases to growth in 
personal income. 
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Colorado adopts a statutory spending restriction that limits general fund appropriations 
to the lesser of five percent of total state personal income or six percent over the 
previous year’s appropriations. 
 
Connecticut enacts a statutory TEL limiting budget growth to either average growth in 
personal income over the previous five years, or the previous year’s increase in 
inflation, whichever is greater. 
 
19
91
 
North Carolina passes a statutory TEL that limits funding to seven percent or less of 
personal income growth. 
Colorado passes a Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) that constitutionally limits state  
revenue collections and expenditures.  Revenue is limited to population growth plus 
inflation. The state’s voters must approve any changes in spending or tax increases. 
 
Connecticut voters approve an additional constitutional limit, but it does not  receive the 
necessary approval of the state legislature. 
 
Iowa enacts a statutory TEL limiting appropriations to 99 percent of anticipated revenue 
collections. 
 
19
92
 
Rhode Island voters approve a constitutional TEL that limits state appropriations to 98 
percent of anticipated revenue collections.   
 
Louisiana passes a constitutional TEL limiting state expenditures to 1992 appropriations 
plus annual increases in state per capita personal income. 
19
93
 
Washington enacts a statutory TEL, limiting state spending increases to the average 
inflation over the previous three years, plus population growth.   
19
94
 
Florida approves a constitutional TEL limiting revenue collections to the average growth 
in state personal income over the previous five years. 
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19
96
 
Missouri adopts a constitutional TEL limiting state revenue collections to 5.64 percent of 
the previous year’s total state personal income . 
20
00
 
Oregon passes a constitutional TEL requiring that any general fund revenue in excess 
of two percent of the revenue estimate must be refunded to taxpayers. 
Oregon residents approve the passage of a statutory TEL limiting growth in 
appropriations to eight percent of projected personal income. 
20
01
 
Wisconsin adopts a statutory TEL limiting spending growth on qualified appropriations to 
the personal income growth rate. 
20
02
 
Indiana enacts a statutory TEL spending cap per fiscal year with growth according to the 
formula for each budget period. 
20
05
 
Maine voters approve a statutory TEL limiting growth in expenditures to the 10-year 
average of personal income growth, with a maximum of 2.75 percent. 
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CASE STUDIES 
 
 The states of Colorado, Washington, and Michigan are profiled to understand the 
impact of TELs that are currently in place. Each of these states has a TEL with an 
important structural characteristic. The state of Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights 
(TABOR) is the most stringent of the tax and expenditure limits. Further, it is a good 
case for policymakers in Ohio to examine given its long history, similarity in structure to 
the Blackwell proposal, and the abundance of analysis that has been performed on the 
TABOR’s impact on state finances. Washington, like Colorado, uses a formula of 
population plus inflation growth to determine growth in state spending. Michigan, unlike 
the other two states, uses a revenue-limiting mechanism based on personal income 
plus inflation.  The Michigan model is important to understand because the state 
underwent major fiscal changes in the mid 1990s as a result of the adoption of Proposal 
A, which shifted the K-12 grade educational funding burden from property taxes to a 
mixed tax collection system.  A similar situation could occur in Ohio. Also, the Michigan 
law is the model of Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro’s alternative to the Secretary of 
State Ken Blackwell’s proposed amendment to Ohio’s constitution. 
 
State Profile – Colorado 
 
The state of Colorado has a history of tax and expenditure limitations that date 
back to the mid 1970s. Colorado was one of the earliest states to enact a general fund 
limitation when the legislature approved the state’s first TEL in 1977 (refer to Table 2). 
This early TEL used the previous year’s appropriations as a baseline for future 
spending, limiting increases in appropriations to seven percent of the previous year’s 
general fund appropriation. Although the legislation included a sunset provision that 
would have seen the provision expire in 1983, the legislature amended the provision in 
1979 and abolished the sunset date. The collapse of the energy and construction 
industries in the 1980s led to a generalized state recession and reduced state revenues. 
The legislature responded to these twin downturns by lowering the existing growth rate 
in the TEL to six percent of the previous year’s general fund expenditures in 1991. 
Colorado’s citizens became increasingly unsatisfied with state government during this 
time period, believing it to be wasteful and ineffective.  
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Table 2 
 Highlights of Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) 
?  Passed in 1992 as a constitutional amendment by Colorado voters. Three general provisions: 
? Expenditure growth is restricted to inflation growth in Denver-Boulder area plus statewide 
population change 
? Any surplus revenue must be refunded to the taxpayers 
? Any increase or change in tax rates must be approved by voters 
? TABOR, which ratchets down spending, combined with a constitutional amendment passed in 2000 
that increased spending on K-12 education (Amendment 23) created a flaw in the structure of state 
finances. 
? Colorado has experienced increased spending for K-12 education, corrections, and Medicaid, and 
decreased spending in virtually all other areas. 
? Although the state has experienced decreased spending in several key areas, public support for 
TABOR remains high. 
? Spending decreased during the recession, but TABOR prevents rapid increases to past spending 
levels with the economic recovery. 
? In November 2005, Colorado voters approved Referendum C retaining the TABOR surplus that is 
expected to occur over the next five years. The referendum was supported by 53 percent of the 
voters. The expected surplus equals $3.7 billion and will be used to meet mandated spending 
increases in K-12 education, deal with demographically generated increases in healthcare 
spending, and increase higher education spending. 
 
 
Citizen groups came together to develop the first ballot initiative aimed at limiting 
the size of state government in 1986. The 1986 proposed constitutional amendment 
would have reduced the taxing authority of state and local governments by requiring 
voter approval for any new or increased tax. The initial amendment drive was 
disconnected, inadequately funded, and ultimately failed at the polls. Citizen groups, led 
by California native Douglas Bruce, came together to support his first ballot initiative 
aimed at limiting state government in 1988. Bruce’s goal was to implement a 
constitutional restriction on the size of state government, in terms of both taxing and 
spending capacity. This time the initiative was more aggressive and far more restrictive. 
The 1988 limitation again required voter approval for any new or increased taxes but 
also reduced state income taxes by 10 percent, limited local residential property taxes, 
and rolled back any state and local tax increases adopted between 1986 and 1988 that 
were not approved by voters.15 Although better organized and well funded, this initiative 
also failed. Bruce was undeterred, championing a third initiative in 1990.  
 
The 1990 initiative proposed a limit on state spending growth, a cap on local 
property taxes, and voter approval for new taxes. While the 1990 amendment enjoyed  
                                            
15 James 
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the greatest voter support of the three initiatives (49 percent), it also failed. The fourth  
try was the charm; a successful campaign was finally realized in 1992. Bruce mounted a 
well-funded and organized campaign, and a consensus developed among residents that 
taxes were too high.  The Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) became a national model 
for the voter-initiated TELs.  
 
The economic and political climate in Colorado during the early 1990s was ideal  
for the passage of TABOR. The state had slipped into a recession, Bruce secured 
support from the state’s Republican establishment, and polling showed that more than 
63 percent of residents thought taxes were too high. In addition to these factors, there 
was little organized opposition to TABOR. Roy Romer, the governor at the time, was 
more concerned with passing a sales tax increase earmarked for education than he  
was in coordinating an opposition effort to TABOR. This meant that TABOR was largely 
unopposed, without alternatives for voters to consider. This recipe proved successful at 
the polls in 1992. 
 
 TABOR remains the most stringent tax and expenditure limit employed by any 
state. Colorado’s TABOR is fundamentally a revenue limit and has three main 
provisions or components. First, it restricts growth in state revenue and  
spending to inflation plus the percentage change in population. The growth formula 
appears to be designed to keep real per capita state spending constant over time. For 
the purposes of TABOR, inflation is determined by The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
inflation rate for the Denver-Boulder area.  The population rate is limited to the reported 
state population growth rate. Second, TABOR requires that surplus revenue above the 
defined limit be rebated to taxpayers. This is done in the year after the surplus has been 
accumulated. This revenue is commonly referred to as the TABOR surplus.16  Third, 
simple majority voter approval is required for new taxes, tax rate increases, extensions 
of expiring taxes, and any change in tax policy that results in a revenue gain by 
government.  
 
TABOR was politically popular during years of economic expansion, but when 
the 2001 recession hit the state, it created an extremely challenging fiscal environment. 
When the recession hit, revenue surpluses quickly disappeared. As surpluses 
disappeared and tax revenues continued to plummet, the state was still required to 
provide TABOR rebates for the previous year, while concurrently implementing 
reductions in state spending. TABOR proved to be a fiscal accelerator rather than a  
                                            
16 Tax revenue is returned to citizens in a number of ways under the various TELs that are at work in the 
states. Tax rebates, tax refunds, and tax credits are the most common ways money is returned to 
individual taxpayers.  
 A Review of Tax Expenditure Limitations 
and their Impact on State & Local Government in Ohio 
 
 
 
The Center for Public Management   30
 
fiscal stabilizer, exacerbating the state’s financial difficulties. To further complicate 
matters, the state did not maintain a budget stabilization (or rainy day) fund from which  
to withdraw funds, cushion the effects of the recession, or make the TABOR rebate 
payments. Therefore, there were little to no reserves to tap when revenues declined. 
Spending “ratcheted down” in Colorado. 
 
Barry Poulson of Americans for Prosperity contends that Colorado faced a 
“structural deficit” that was the result of the recession plus the state’s constitutional 
spending constraints. The state is forced to simultaneously grapple with TABOR’s 
revenue restrictions and respond to constitutionally mandated spending for various 
programs.17 While TABOR ratchets down the amount of revenue the state can spend, 
constitutional Amendment 23 ratcheted up state spending on K-12 education. In 2000, 
voters approved Amendment 23, a provision requiring annual growth in expenditures for 
K-12 education by a rate of inflation plus one percent through 2010 and just by the 
inflation rate thereafter. The new K-12 money comes from tax revenues, is earmarked 
for educational purposes, and is exempt from the TABOR spending limit. Further 
intensifying the situation are the state’s constitutional provisions requiring a balanced 
budget and the prohibition of most forms of debt. Many critics of TABOR claim that the 
precarious balance between competing interests has led to the state’s worst fiscal crisis 
in decades. 
 
The effect of TABOR on state expenditures has been remarkable. Because more 
than two-thirds of state revenues are allocated by mandates to K-12 education, 
Medicaid, and corrections, the state legislature controls less than one-third of the 
budget. According to a study done by the Colorado Legislative Council staff, general 
fund spending on K-12 education has increased from 37 to 42 percent of the budget 
since the inception of TABOR. In addition to increased spending for education, general 
fund spending has increased in healthcare (including Medicaid) by 13 percent and 
spending in corrections has jumped by 19 percent. By contrast, spending on other state 
programs, such as higher education, human services, and judicial services, decreased 
by 28 percent.  
 
The most striking decrease, however, was realized in the area of capital 
spending, where spending nearly stopped. Capital spending has declined by 97 
percent.18  
 
In December 2003, the University of Colorado conducted a study entitled,  
                                            
17 Poulson B.D. (2005).  
18 Poulson B.D. (2005).  
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Surviving Financial Challenges in Colorado Public Higher Education. The authors 
provide support to the assertion that the state has created a difficult environment in 
which to operate higher education. The study notes that during the period of FY1995 to  
FY2004, state spending on higher education student support has been reduced by more 
than $179 million. The TABOR ratchet and the 2001 recession forced the state to cut 
inflation-adjusted general fund spending on a per capita basis by 5.8 percent in fiscal 
year 2002, 7.4 percent in fiscal year 2003, and 2.2 percent in fiscal year 2004  
(The Economist, October 8, 2005, p. 40). Colorado’s economy started to recover in FY 
2005 but the spending baseline is set to the FY 2004 levels, which are nearly 16 
percent below 2001 levels on a per capita basis, and the constitutionally mandated 
increases in K-12 education continue apace.19 Because TABOR restricts budget 
increases to a percentage of the previous year’s spending and a rainy day fund does 
not exist to support spending levels during a downturn, then spending cannot quickly 
rebound to pre-recessionary levels. If TABOR were still binding in Colorado, it could 
take between five to eight years to reach FY 2001 spending levels in absolute dollar 
terms, not adjusting for inflation. We cannot calculate how long it would take to reach 
FY 2001 inflation-adjusted per capita spending levels. Some may consider this a 
desirable outcome from TABOR; however, Colorado voters decided otherwise in 
November 2005. 
 
 Public sentiment regarding TABOR and the growth of state government in 
Colorado remains divided. In November 2005, voters approved Referendum C, which 
allows the state use the TABOR surplus that is expected to occur over the next five 
years on operating expenses. The referendum was supported by 53 percent of the 
voters. The expected surplus equals $3.7 billion and will be used to meet mandated 
spending increases in K-12 education, deal with demographically generated increases 
in healthcare spending, and increase higher education spending. During the same 
election, however, residents of Colorado voted down Referendum D in an extremely 
close vote. Referendum D would have permitted the state to borrow $2.1 billion to fund 
road construction, capital construction for schools, and pay pensions for firefighters and 
police. The impacts of Colorado’s TABOR are noted in Table 3. 
                                            
19 Office of the President, Office of the Vice President for Budget and Finance, University of Colorado. 
Surviving Financial Challenges in Colorado Public Higher Education. (2003).  
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Table 3 
 What we learned from the state of Colorado’s TABOR 
?  Without guaranteed baseline spending level, states with tax and expenditure limitations face years 
of real dollar declines in state spending after recessions hit and recoveries begin. 
? Tax and expenditure limitations should provide a safeguard against declining revenues by 
implementing a budget stabilization fund (rainy day fund). The state of Colorado does not employ a 
true rainy day fund, therefore, when revenues declined the state could not utilize revenues 
husbanded during economic good times.  
? The state of Colorado operates under a unique fiscal structure. The state has constitutional 
requirements that limit revenue growth while at the same time a constitutional amendment exists 
requiring increased spending for education. This is a “structural deficit.”  
? TABOR has resulted in reductions in spending for higher education, human services, and judicial 
services.  Further, capital spending has been all but eliminated with a 97 percent reduction in 
spending. 
? Even in the face of decreased service delivery and suspended investment in public capital, 
residents of Colorado continue to support TABOR. 
 
State Profile – Washington 
 
Like many states throughout the country, Washington experienced a popular tax 
revolt of the late 1970s. Beginning in 1971, voters passed legislation limiting annual 
increases in local property tax collections to six percent.   A year later, voters enacted 
the state’s 55th constitutional amendment, which further restricted state property tax 
increases to one percent of the true and fair market value of real estate. 
Simultaneously, state legislators shifted the property tax assessment standards from 50 
to 100 percent of their market value. In 1979, voters revised the 1971 property tax limit 
when they passed Initiative 62.  Total state and local property tax collections were 
restricted to six percent of fair market value. Table 4 provides highlights of Washington’s 
tax limitation movement. 
Table 4 
 Highlights of Washington’s Tax Limitation 
?  Washington was one of the first states to implement a TEL during the anti-tax resurgence of the 
early 1990s. The TEL, I-601, is statutory and can be overturned by a supermajority legislative vote. 
I-601 was one of the first TELs to utilize an expenditure growth formula of inflation plus population 
growth.  Another unique aspect of I-601 is the requirement that the state not shift the burden of 
taxation to local governments.   
? Though they passed a fairly effective TEL (effective in terms of accomplishing the goals stated in 
the proposal), Washington voters continued to pass ballot initiatives aimed at shifting or eliminating 
the state’s tax burden. In 1998, I-695 was enacted, which reduced the motor vehicle excise tax. The 
tax was reduced a second time in 2001 when I-747 was passed.  
? One key person, Tim Eyman, served as the motivating factor behind much of the success of the tax 
limiting mechanisms put in place in Washington. The presence of a single policy entrepreneur is 
common in a number of states.   
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The support for these tax limits was bipartisan. The legislation passed during the 
early 1970s occurred with a Republican-controlled house, a Democratic senate, and a 
Republican governor. The legislative revisions of 1979 occurred with a Democrat-
controlled senate, a split house, and a Democrat as governor.   
 
Little in the way of tax reform occurred during the 1980s. In 1993, however, 
voters turned to the polls to enact Initiative 601, the state’s first true TEL. Initiative 601 
sought to influence five major aspects of state fiscal policy. These include: (1) annual 
limits on state general fund expenditures, (2) spending adjustments based on program 
funding shifts, (3) a future limit funding formula called “rebasing,” (4) an emergency 
reserve fund, and (5) a supermajority  legislature requirement (two-thirds) to approve 
spending increases above the formula. 
 
The expenditure growth formula was based on the average of the previous three 
years’ inflation rates plus the average of the previous three years’ population growth 
rates. The practice of rebasing means that, “when actual expenditures fall below the 
spending limit, the future limits be based on the lower amount.” Another unique aspect 
of I-601 is that it “prevented the legislature from circumventing the limit by devolving 
functions of the government to localities.”  
 
The effects of I-601 have been mixed. One study shows that in the four years 
prior to I-601’s enactment, state spending increased by approximately 17 percent 
annually. In the four years following its implementation, state spending has had an 
average annual increase of 8.6 percent.  In the first budget year after the 
implementation of I-601, public universities lost $39 million, while other public  
institutions, such as prisons and social services, lost about of $120 million in funding.20 
 
In 2001, voters returned to the polls to pass Initiative 747, which limited state and 
local property tax increases to one percent annually. This bill revised state referendum 
47, passed in 1997, which limited property tax increases to the rate of inflation. In each 
instance, a “substantial need” clause was left in place to allow for revenue that was 
collected in previous years and was not spent to be applied to future expenditures if 
revenue shortfalls occur. Initially, this clause allowed for increases of up to six percent 
(for instance, if the rate of inflation was three percent in 1999, but revenue collections 
only increased by 1.5 percent, the additional 1.5 percent could be added to the 
allowable revenue increase in a future year should a budget shortfall occur).  
 
With the passage of I-747, the substantial need clause only allows untapped  
                                            
20 Lefberg, I. and Haugen, C. (1999),  
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revenue to be applied to collections should inflation fall below one percent, and then  
only up to one percent.  While an increase in funding beyond one percent is allowable 
through a popular vote (termed a “lid lift”), districts are concerned with both voter 
fatigue, and the high public cost associated with running a potentially unsuccessful lid 
lift campaign with already limited funding.21   
 
In 2005, Tim Eyman, Washington’s anti-tax policy entrepreneur, sponsored 
another bill, I-900, aimed at requiring state and local performance audits; these audits 
are to be funded by an undedicated 16 percent of the state’s sales tax revenues. 
Advocates claim the bill would increase the efficiency of state executive, legislative, and 
judicial leadership and provide accountability for the state’s public sector.   Critics, 
however, counter that the proposal is poorly drafted and ambiguous. The proposal was 
passed by voters in the November 2005 election. Lessons learned from Washington’s 
TEL experience are noted in Table 5.   
  
Table 5 
 What we learned from the state of Washington’s TEL 
? I-601, like Colorado’s TABOR, has led to a decrease in state spending.  
? In the first year after I-601 was implemented, state spending for higher education fell by $39 
million, while state spending for other programs such as prisons and social services fell $120 
million. 
? I-747, an additional limit on local property tax increases, has hamstrung local governments and 
led to a decrease in funding for special districts (fire, EMS, libraries, etc.). 
 
 
State Profile – Michigan 
 
In 1978, Michigan voters passed a constitutional revenue limit, the Headlee 
Amendment.  The Headlee Amendment sought to accomplish several things, including 
limiting state revenue collections to 9.49 percent of personal income, forbidding 
unfunded mandates from being placed on local governments in an attempt to shift the 
tax burden, and assuring that property tax growth never exceeds the annual rate of 
inflation.  Any increase in revenue collected beyond 9.49 percent of personal income 
requires voter approval.  The amendment also includes the use of a budget stabilization 
fund for a proportion of the revenues collected. The Budget Stabilization Fund (BSF) 
acts as a rainy day fund and requires that any time growth in state real personal income 
exceeds two percent that funds are to be appropriated to the BSF.  In the event that 
revenue collections decline from the previous year’s collections, money can be  
                                            
21 Idemoto, S. (2001).  
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withdrawn from the fund to offset budget shortages.  The BSF also allows funds to be 
disbursed for economic stabilization purposes in the event that state unemployment  
rates rise above eight percent for any quarter. One unique aspect of the Headlee 
Amendment is that, unlike the many tax expenditure limitations being adopted 
throughout the country, the Headlee Amendment solely restricts revenue collections, as 
opposed to the numerous expenditure-limiting mechanisms. The highlights of 
Michigan’s Headlee Amendment are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
 Highlights of Michigan’s Headlee Amendment 
?  The Headlee Amendment, passed in 1978, limits state revenue collections to 9.49 percent of 
state personal income annually. The Headlee Amendment solely restricts revenue collections, 
as opposed to the numerous expenditure-limiting mechanisms. 
? It disallows unfunded mandates on local governments and requires voter approval for any 
collections beyond 9.49 percent. 
? Headlee also established a budget stabilization fund for a proportion of the revenues collected.  
 
 
At the time of the amendment’s 1978 adoption, it was depicted as a tool to 
manage state government funding more efficiently, not necessarily as a way to cut back 
on increases in state expenditures.  Opponents of the proposal argued that the bill 
would drastically cut state government’s ability to fund and maintain state programs, 
though this appears to have not been the case. 
 
In 1993, a blue-ribbon state commission was formed to study the effects of the 
Headlee Amendment over the previous 15 years.  The commission concluded that the 
amendment had been “fairly effective” in achieving its desired results. The exception 
was in fiscal years 1994-1996, after the passage of Michigan’s comprehensive school 
finance reform legislation (Proposal A). Proposal A replaced the original educational 
funding system, based on property taxes, with a system based on tax revenues 
provided by a formula from the state.  The new tax system put into place to fund schools 
on a statewide basis under Proposal A pushed revenue collections above the Headlee 
limit from 1994 to 1996.  As personal income rose, the limit was reattained in 1997.  
Some communities have been adversely effected by the limits placed on property tax 
growth by the combined effect of the Headlee Amendment and 1994’s Proposal A.  
Aside from re-calculating the traditional educational funding formula, Proposal A limited 
the annual allowable increase in property tax rates to five percent or the growth in the 
consumer price index, whichever is less.   This has caused many communities to 
propose ballot initiatives to generate additional revenues for specific projects.   
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Overall, the Headlee Amendment appears to be much less divisive and politically 
contested than many of the other TELs that were reviewed.   While a great deal of  
contention occurred prior to the adoption of the amendment, very few of the dire 
predictions made in Michigan have come to fruition, and overall state revenue growth 
has remained fairly steady while still allowing modest growth in program funding. The 
public policy challenges derived from the Headlee Amendment lie in the future. Three of 
Michigan’s largest employers, Ford, General Motors, and Delphi, face major challenges 
that will affect the incomes of their current employees, and employees in their supply 
chain, and could lower the incomes of the companies’ retirees. There is a chance that 
total personal income in the state could decline for a substantial period of time. The 
Headlee Amendment can be viewed as a tool to “right size” government in a more 
austere fiscal era or it can be seen as a hammer that prevents social services from 
being extended to the newly impoverished and fiscal aid being delivered to the state’s 
major cities that will have to adjust to shuttered plants. What has come to light from the 
adoption of the Headlee Amendment is shown in Table 7.    
 
Table 7 
 What we learned from the state of Michigan’s Headlee Amendment 
?  A generous funding mechanism, such as allowing revenue to reach 9.49 percent of state personal 
income, can minimize the political difficulty of adopting TELs and allow for efficient annual increases 
in government growth while still maintaining a sense of government accountability.   
? The development of a budget stabilization or rainy day fund can help to offset slow periods of 
economic growth by supplementing revenue shortfalls.  
? The adoption of a TEL should be analyzed in terms of potential changes to the structure of funding 
major state programs in the future.  For instance, the Headlee Amendment produced revenue 
shortfalls for three years due to the change in funding for education. 
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THE STATE OF OHIO 
 
Ohio History 
  
 During the mid 1970s, the state of Ohio experienced double-digit levels of 
inflation, leading to rapidly increasing property tax rates. Homeowners, especially 
seniors, began pressuring government for some form of tax relief. Lawmakers 
understood the political implications of the skyrocketing tax rates and attempted to stave 
off an impending tax revolt by introducing House Bill 920 in 1976. George Voinovich, 
then Cuyahoga County Auditor, ushered the bill through the state legislature. Voinovich, 
along with the Ohio legislature, had good intentions in enacting HB 920. There were, 
however, serious unintended consequences for the state’s public schools. 
 
House Bill 920 was voted into Ohio’s constitution in 1980, creating a three-tier 
real property tax system: constitutionally approved inside millage, renewal levies, and 
operating (or new) levies.  The constitution allows state and local property taxes up to a 
limit of one percent of fair market value by charter or with legislative approval.  Since the 
state does not assess a property tax, this assessment “belongs” to localities.  Any 
property taxes above the constitutionally sanctioned amount needs to be approved by a 
direct vote of the people.  The one percent cap is equivalent to a property tax of 10 mills 
and is frequently referred to as the “inside millage” because it is inside the constitutional 
limit.  House Bill 920 regulates the “outside millage.”  Inside millage is not subject to the 
constraints imposed by HB 920, and tax revenue generated by the inside mills can 
increase as the fair market value of the property appreciates. 
 
House Bill 920 regulates the way property taxes are levied on millage outside of 
the constitutional restriction.  Taxing jurisdictions—most frequently schools, library 
districts, counties for human service levies, community colleges, and special districts—
go to the voters to approve property tax levies above the constitutional limit for a 
specific purpose and for a limited time period in order to yield a specified amount of tax 
revenue.  If during the time the levy is in effect the average property values increase in 
a taxing district then the effective millage is reduced to keep the annual revenue earned 
by the tax the same over the levy’s life.22  When the time limit for the levy is reached, 
the tax sunsets and the taxing district then launches a campaign for a renewal levy,  
                                            
22 The value of individual properties will increase at different rates.  If a property increases at a faster rate 
than the average in the taxing district, its property taxes will increase; if the property increases in value at 
a slower rate than the average in the taxing district, its taxes will decrease.  This is known as tax 
equalization. 
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which will bring in the same amount of money as the expired levy.  If the district wants 
an increase in tax revenues, it campaigns for the renewal and an increase.  If the district 
confronts an increase in operating costs before the levy expires, the voters will be asked 
to vote for an increase, sometimes this is called an “emergency levy.”  The bottom line 
is that a multi-year tax levy will diminish in its real, inflation-adjusted, tax revenue as 
operating costs increase. 
 
There are three unintended consequences associated with the operation of HB 
920 and they disproportionately effect public school districts.  First, the taxing districts—
especially school districts—are frequently before the voters campaigning for either 
renewal levies or increased operating levies if they are to maintain their performance 
and their operations.   This leads to voter fatigue, and puts the school district leadership 
in a constant campaign mode.  Second, voters who want to vote against their total tax 
burden only have a chance to express their sentiment through their votes on local 
property taxes, and the schools suffer disproportionately.  Third, the state’s school 
funding formula accounts for the current assessed value as if it is yielding property tax 
revenue without the constraints of HB 920.  This means that districts with rapidly rising 
property values or with a great deal of new, high-value development are penalized in 
their state school funding.  This accounting problem has been labeled “phantom 
revenue.” 
 
 Policy makers and residents offer varying opinions on the success or failure of 
HB 920. On one hand, public opinion remains strongly in favor of 920 with a majority of 
voters unwilling to change the formula for local property tax collections. Further, there 
are some voters who appreciate a formula that requires local governments to continue 
to justify their current levels of spending and performance through tax levy renewal 
campaigns. However, numerous policy makers contend that the effect of HB 920 on K-
12 education in the state of Ohio has been disastrous. One of the unintended 
consequences of 920 was that it severely constrained both the revenue and expenditure 
growth of local school districts. Most significantly, 920 does not allow local school 
districts’ revenues, which depend on property taxes, to increase with inflation. When a 
local school district passes a levy, the effective millage, for the life of the levy, applies to 
the property values at the time the levy was passed. The result has been districts 
returning to the ballot frequently not only for levy increases but to maintain current 
millage. Norma Conner, Superintendent of North Olmsted schools, summed up the 
situation from the perspective of a leader of a school district: “We have no way to 
actually increase our revenues over time, simply just to keep up with inflation or 
increasing property values, and so consequently schools continually have to go back to 
the voters, spend time and countless hours that could have better been spent on the 
purpose of schooling, which is an educational mission, not a fundraising mission.”  
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Robert Matsen, North Olmsted School District treasurer, underscored the 
difficulty of schools under 920 when he observed the difference in local jurisdictional 
and school district tax structures. Matsen notes that from 1995 to 2001 the city of North 
Olmsted enjoyed a 28 percent increase in tax revenues from local income, or wage 
taxes. If the school district had enjoyed that same increase, there would have been no 
need to go to the voters for increases. This is the dilemma faced by nearly every school 
district in Ohio in the wake of HB 920.  
 
The state does have a legislative tool at its disposal to weaken the hold of HB 
920 on local units of government that rely on the property tax, especially school districts. 
The state constitution’s one percent cap on “inside millage” allows unvoted state and 
local property taxes to equal one percent of fair market value. However, the legislature 
sets fair market value at 35 percent of assessed value. The legislature could change the 
rules on the calculation of inside millage by allowing the assessment ratio to move from 
35 percent of fair market value to 100 percent. This would allow a larger portion of the 
property tax to adjust automatically with inflation or the increase in property values. 
 
The Ohio TEL Proposal 
 
The spending cap 
 
Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell is championing a TEL that applies 
expenditure limits to all units of government in Ohio. Blackwell and Citizens for Tax 
Reform (CFTR) are at the forefront of the effort to implement a tax and expenditure 
limitation in Ohio. Blackwell, like Douglas Bruce in Colorado and Tim Eyman in 
Washington, is a leader with a strong base of support from which to draw resources. 
While there is much debate surrounding the contents of the proposed TEL in Ohio, 
CFTR and Blackwell have moderated their earlier proposals for a TEL, taking into 
account many of the difficulties the state of Colorado encountered with TABOR.  
 
The  proposed TEL amendment to Ohio’s constitution ties annual spending limits 
to one of two formulas: The expenditure limit can be increased by the combination of 
the inflation rate and population growth rate or by a 3.5 percent increase in 
governmental expenditures, whichever is larger.   The Ohio proposal differs from 
Colorado’s TABOR in several respects.  During recessions, Colorado saw its budgets 
decimated, with the effects of those cuts continuing for years due to the structure of the 
expenditure cap. However, under the Ohio TEL proposal, Ohio would 
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• Guarantee maximum spending increases of 3.5 percent per year 
• Safeguard unspent revenues. Any unspent revenue up to 15 percent over 
the budget is placed in a budget reserve fund (rainy day fund), and once 
the fund exceeds 15 percent of the budget, the surplus is refunded to the 
taxpayers (thereby fixing a second of TABOR’s flaws)  
 
The Ohio TEL plan also departs from Colorado’s TABOR in that 
accommodations are made for any subsequent constitutional amendments. When the 
state of Colorado passed a mandatory spending amendment for K-12 education, it 
affected the entire state budget. If this were to happen in Ohio, the TEL would be 
voided. If there are any constitutionally mandated spending increases introduced into  
Ohio’s fiscal arena, the TEL becomes null and void.23 CFTR touts that its TEL limits only 
what is spent and not how money is raised, which is an important improvement over 
Colorado.  
 
Also notable is the removal of a requirement that a supermajority of the 
legislature is needed to seek voter approval for exceeding the annual spending limits at 
the state level. Under the certified version of the Ohio TEL proposal that we inspected in 
fall of 2005, only a simple majority in the legislature is needed to seek voter approval for 
an increase in expenditures. However, any increase in state expenditures in excess of 
the TEL cap requires both a majority vote in the legislature and a majority vote “of the 
electors.”24 
 
The Ohio TEL proposal guarantees that local governments have a guaranteed 
appropriation of five percent of state revenues, and forbids state government from 
mandating local government expenditures without providing the revenue to support 
them. Since 1995, the local government fund has had “guaranteed” funding of 4.2 
percent of state expenditures. House Bill 117 permanently set the state and local 
government fund’s percentage share of state sales tax, use tax, personal income tax, 
public utility tax, and corporate franchise tax at 4.2 percent. While this level of spending 
has been pledged, the legislature has, in recent history, reduced this percentage to 
varying levels. While Blackwell’s proposal guarantees that local government will receive 
a baseline level of spending of five percent of the state’s own-source tax revenues, the 
source of the revenues going into the local government fund is unclear, as is its impact 
on other revenues that flow to other local political jurisdictions.  
 
                                            
23 All Ohio TEL information comes directly from the TEL amendment.  
24 We comment on the definition of an elector later in this report. 
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The CFTR proposed Ohio TEL has benefited from the experiences with state 
level tax and expenditure limitation efforts across the country. The proposed TEL does 
not limit revenue collections and excludes all Medicaid funding, federal funds, tax 
relief—such as the 10 percent Homestead property tax rollback, and any other non-
General Revenue Fund monies. The Ohio TEL appears to focus on the remaining 
portion of the state’s General Revenue Fund budget. The proposal is more thoughtful in 
its approach to limiting government spending than its predecessors in other states.  
 
Although the Ohio TEL proposal is more carefully designed than its 
predecessors, the potential for ratcheting down spending remains. The expenditure 
base under the TEL is the amount of money spent in the previous year, and the  
spending cap allows additional spending of 3.5 percent or the formula cap, whichever is  
larger.  The proposed limit applies only to those revenues the state is able to collect.  
Therefore the problems that Colorado experienced with recession-induced spending 
cutbacks lasting well into the recovery phase of the business cycle could manifest in 
Ohio if the proposed TEL is put in place. If the state were to encounter declining 
revenues and the budget stabilization fund is exhausted, as happened in the 2001 
recession, then the state government would base its next year’s budget on actual 
expenditures plus one of the two growth factors (3.5 percent or the combination of the 
inflation rate and the population growth rate) allowed by the TEL.  Starting with the 
lower budget base potentially restricts any natural rebound in revenues that comes from 
the expansion phase of the economic cycle.   
 
While Secretary Blackwell and CFTR were cautious enough to insert a provision 
that reduces the potential for an actual decline in expenditures with the alternative 3.5 
percent cap on expenditure increases, the proposal does not account for severe 
downturns in the business cycle and the accompanying reduction in revenue. Any real 
reduction in the revenue stream will be associated with ratcheting down state spending 
accompanied by budget cuts and a constitutionally mandated delay in bringing the 
budget back to its previous size.  
 
The problem of “ratcheting down” has created considerable budgeting problems 
in Colorado and is frequently pointed to as a major obstacle in restoring expenditure 
levels when revenues begin to rebound. However, it should be noted that the proposed 
Ohio TEL is superior to Colorado’s in that budget growth can take place at 3.5 percent a 
year, rather than being restricted to the algebraic cap that combines inflation and 
population growth.  So while declining revenues would undoubtedly place a strain on 
program funding in Ohio, the budget would rebound more rapidly than in Colorado. 
Despite the superiority of the Ohio proposal compared to Colorado’s TABOR, the state 
of Ohio would likely encounter a harsh fiscal environment characterized by budget  
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constraints and program cuts during a multi-year recession and a structural delay in 
rebuilding the budget once a recovery has been achieved.25   Ratcheting down effects  
could be countered if a “TEL accelerator” became part of the proposal.  An accelerator 
would permit the state to restore spending to pre-recessionary levels in the wake of  
business cycle downturns as long as the revenue was available to the state.  Colorado’s  
experience demonstrates that including an accelerator to the Ohio TEL proposal would 
be prudent.  
 
Colorado voters approved Referendum C in November 2005 allowing the state to 
temporarily retain and spend the budget surplus that is expected to be generated over 
the next five years, rather than fully comply with TABOR. The passage of Referendum 
C was necessary in order to keep approximately $3.7 billion to fund mandated spending 
increases in K-12 education, deal with demographically-generated increases in 
healthcare spending, and increase higher education spending.  Prior to the vote on 
Referendum C, the governor’s budget director released information indicating that 
without passage, the state would need to close 11 state parks, raise state university 
tuition, cap the prison population, end instant background checks on firearms 
purchases, cut funding for healthcare for the poor, and eliminate inspections of ski 
lifts.26  
 
One final consideration should be noted regarding the Ohio TEL proposal’s 
guaranteed baseline maximum spending level of 3.5 percent versus actual historical 
spending levels. Although rare, there are occasions in which the state spends below 3.5 
percent, as it did in FY 2003 when the budget grew by only 2.83 percent, and as it is 
projected to do in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Budget growth under 3.5 percent may be 
necessary during times of lean economic growth, but under the TEL proposal there is 
incentive to pursue the maximum spending growth when revenues permit.    
 
The TEL proposal provides an incentive to the legislature and those who benefit 
from public spending to budget the entire “guaranteed” maximum increase in public  
                                            
25 Ohio budgets on a two-year cycle with the constraint that the budget must balance with revenues in 
each year, leading to budget adjustment bills during recessions.  How the annual budgets would operate 
under a TEL is not clear.  A two-year budget could be initially passed that complies with the TEL with 
spending kept under one of the two caps.  Then if a recession hit and state revenues fell, the actual first 
year budget would be reduced once the budget is balanced against actual revenues.  The actual first year 
expenditures would then become the base used to calculate the TEL amount in the second year of the 
biannual budget, not the amount that was included in the original budget resolution.  Even if state 
revenues recovered in the second year and the original budget passed for the second year of the 
biennium could be achieved, the cap from the TEL would be binding. 
26 Couch & Fates, “Voters Say Yes to C”.  
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spending of 3.5 percent.  At this point, it is revealing to examine Ohio’s actual budget 
performance since 1996 and estimate to the best of our ability what Ohio’s budget 
picture would have been if the Ohio TEL amendment had been in place since the mid-
1990s. 
 
What would Ohio’s budget look like under the proposed TEL? 
 
 To understand the ramifications of the proposed constitutional TEL amendment 
on tax expenditures, a simulated expenditure model constructed by the Ohio House of 
Representatives budget staff was compared to actual budget expenditures. The Ohio  
House of Representatives budget staff examined the Ohio budget from fiscal year 1996 
through the proposed 2005 budget.  Determining what spending would be included 
under the proposed TEL was difficult, given the lack of information provided in the  
proposal on how to treat various sources of government revenue (an additional  
challenge to simulating the impact of the TEL proposal is that the accounting system 
currently in place in Ohio is not equipped to handle the determination of TEL- 
related budget categories).  
 
Given the information available in the proposal’s language, the House budget 
staff assumed that the Ohio TEL would include the state’s own-source revenues from 
the General Revenue Fund less federal funding that passes through the state budget 
and less any state money paid toward property tax relief.  Therefore, any state money 
that is dedicated to matching federal funds, such as Medicaid or poverty alleviation and 
job training money spent by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, is not to 
be included in the expenditure limitation.  These exclusions are a judgment made by the  
staff as they wrestled with the language in the proposal.  Also not included in the 
House’s projections is any money paid by the state for property tax relief. After 
extracting these budget items, the House budget staff was able to identify how much 
state spending would be affected by an implementation of a TEL. From there, the 
House budget staff examined proposed TEL spending versus actual state spending 
from FY 1997 through the proposed fiscal year 2005 budget (see Table 8).  
 
 The budget estimates are produced for two reasons. It is important to determine 
if the TEL or the CAP proposal would have been binding under a set of assumptions 
about the size of the state budget as currently defined and with data that are reliable. 
The second reason for producing these estimates is to show the portions of the state’s 
budget where real, inflation-adjusted increases in the state’s General Revenue Fund 
spending have occurred. One person’s definition of wasted government spending is 
another’s definition of essential, or constitutionally mandated, government spending. 
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 We caution, however, that the size of the budget and its composition will be 
radically different under the TEL than is the current General Revenue Fund budget. This 
is due to the expansive definition of government in the TEL. This major shift in definition 
makes it impossible to determine the TEL’s actual impact. The TEL clearly includes all 
state revenue, including state spending that is required to meet federal matching 
requirements. The TEL also includes that the Homestead Property Tax Rollback be 
included as state spending because it is not a rebate that goes directly to taxpayers. It is 
a line item expenditure endorsed by the legislature. Finally, the TEL includes all 
“instrumentalities” of the state. This means that the total expenditures of all state-
supported enterprises should be rolled up into the state’s general budget. An 
instrumentality is defined as any “board, commission, authority, public corporation, 
college, university, or other educational institution, or any other entity supported in 
whole or in part by funds appropriated by the general assembly.” This is a radical 
expansion in the definition of what is covered by the state budget, covering everything 
from the expenditures of state-supported hospitals, turnpike authorities, to the total 
budgets of universities and community colleges. 
 
Table 8  
Ohio House Budget Staff Comparison Spreadsheet 
Ohio TEL Proposal (CPI + Population Increase or 3.5% baseline) v. Actual Spending 
Year 
Blackwell Proposed 
Spending 
Percentage 
Increase 
(CPI + 
Population 
Increase) 
Percentage 
Increase 
(under 
Blackwell 
Plan with 
3.5% 
baseline) 
Actual State 
Spending 
Percentage 
Increase Difference 
1996  $ 11,345,799,513.00   $ 11,345,799,513.00     
1997    11,742,902,495.00 3.31% 3.50%    11,924,571,319.00 5.10  $         181,668,824 
1998    12,153,904,082.00 2.60% 3.50%    12,637,561,700.00 5.98  $         483,657,618 
1999    12,579,290,724.00 1.86% 3.50%    13,426,810,019.00 6.25  $         847,519,295 
2000    13,019,565,899.00 2.42% 3.50%    14,357,997,360.00 6.94  $      1,338,431,461 
2001    13,489,572,227.00 3.61% 3.61%    15,506,575,293.00 8.00  $      2,017,003,066 
2002    13,961,707,254.00 3.06% 3.50%    16,141,700,261.00 4.10  $      2,179,993,007 
2003    14,450,367,007.00 1.78% 3.50%    16,598,088,550.00 2.83  $      2,147,721,543 
2004    14,956,129,852.00 2.52% 3.50%    17,210,110,197.00 3.69  $      2,253,980,345 
2005    15,479,594,396.00 2.96% 3.50%    17,871,266,727.00 3.84  $      2,391,672,331 
  2.70% 3.51%  5.2%  $    13,841,647,490 
 Source: Ohio House Budget Staff 
 Actual state spending is calculated using state-only GRF less property tax relief 
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The percentage increase in the budget under the Ohio TEL proposal is the higher 
of either the formula expenditure cap, the consumer price index plus the increase in 
population, or 3.5 percent.  During the time period examined, 1996 through 2005, the 
formula expenditure cap was greater than 3.5 percent in only one year (FY 2001).  In all 
other years, the combination of CPI and population growth in the state of Ohio was less 
than 3.5 percent.  Therefore, the maximum increase in expenditures would have been 
3.5 percent.  Over the course of the time period examined, the average formula cap 
increase would have been 2.7 percent. How would the state’s expenditure picture have 
changed if the proposed TEL had been in place since fiscal year 1996? 
 
The second column of Table 8 displays what the state’s budgeted expenditures 
would have been using the House budget staff’s interpretation of the TEL proposal.  In 
all fiscal years, with the exception of FY 2001, 3.5 percent was used as the escalator.  
The third and fourth columns show the two permissible growth factors.  The bottom of  
the third column lists the average budget increase that would have been allowed if a  
Colorado-style formula TEL cap had been in place.  The fourth column shows the more  
likely annual budget growth factor under the TEL proposal.  The budget is assumed to 
grow at 3.5 percent in all years except fiscal year 2001 when the growth rate is 
assumed to be 3.61 percent.  The average growth rate over this time period is shown at 
the bottom of the column.   The factors in the fourth column were used to calculate the 
TEL budgets given in the second column.  Actual state spending is in the fifth column, 
and the actual percentage increase in state spending is in the sixth column with the 
average given at the bottom of the column.  The dollar difference between actual state 
expenditures and the estimated TEL-constrained budgets are displayed in the last 
column. 
 
 Actual spending was above the TEL level in all years with the cumulative 
difference being $13.8 billion.  The annual difference is now about $2.4 billion.  The 
actual increase in state expenditures was greater than 3.5 percent in all years with the 
exception of FY 2003.  However, the budget picture changed markedly during the last 
legislative session, with budgeted expenditures being much below the TEL limits.27 
 
 The fact that the average annual increase in state expenditures was 5.2 percent 
from FY 1996 to 2005 leads to the question of how was the money spent.  
Representative William Seitz notes that over 85 percent of the state’s General Revenue 
Fund is spent on K-12 schooling, Medicaid (healthcare for the poor, disabled, and low- 
                                            
27 Representative William J. Seitz wrote that the “growth rate (state spending and federal match) is 0.89 
percent in 2006 and 2.57 percent in 2007—far less than the 3.5 percent annual increase than the TEL 
would allow.” (Letter to the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, no date). 
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income elderly), higher education, prisons and the justice system, legislatively 
mandated property tax rebates to homeowners, and debt service on bonds.  Money 
collected from motor fuels taxes are restricted to roadway spending in the constitution.  
Highway funds that come from the federal highway trust fund and Medicaid spending 
were not included in the set of House budget staff’s expenditure estimates because of 
their tie to federal funding.  The Homestead Property Tax Rollbacks was also not 
counted as a covered expenditure by the House staff. However, under the language 
contained in the final version of the TEL, the Rollback would be an expenditure and 
state revenues used to match federal grant requirements would also be considered to 
be expenditures. 
 
 Figure 1 displays 1996 General Revenue Fund expenditures in 1996 dollars in 
the left-hand bar.  Those expenditures are expressed in 2005 dollars so that the 1996 
state expenditures can be compared to those for 2005 in the middle bar.  The right-hand 
bar is based on fiscal year 2005 expenditures. The budget in 2005 was about $4.3 
billion larger in real terms than it was nearly a decade before.  The charts that follow  
show where the real increases have occurred. 
 
 Figure 1 
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The largest real, inflation-adjusted increase in state expenditures from 1996 to 
2005 was in the area of primary and secondary education.  This reflects a conscious  
public policy choice on the part of the state’s governors and legislatures to address the 
physical and fiscal condition of Ohio’s public school system.  Some of the response was 
triggered by the state Supreme Court finding the system of school finance to be 
unconstitutional.  Other parts of the response were a determination to invest in public 
education in return for greater performance accountability on the part of the state’s 
school systems. 
 
School expenditures, expressed in 2005 dollars, were a bit below $6 billion in FY 
1996 and increased by more than $2 billion in FY 2005 (Figure 2).  This investment in 
education accounted for 48.8 percent of the real dollar General Revenue Fund Budget 
increase. 
 
 
 Figure 2 
 
 
The other major areas of increase were the state-supported health and human 
services and the justice systems. The expenditure increases in these two areas were 
driven by different factors.  The increase in spending on the justice system was a policy  
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choice to deal more harshly with felony offenders coupled with a rise in drug use in the 
mid-to-late 1990s.  Demographics also played a part in the increase; the echo from the 
baby boom hit the streets at the same time that crack hit Ohio. The Lucasville prison riot 
during the Voinovich administration also triggered more spending in the prison system. 
 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Spending in FY 1996, expressed in 
2005 dollars, was approximately $400 million less than the amount spent in FY 2005.  
This represents a 31 percent increase in real spending (Figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
The data used to calculate public safety appropriations are approximate due to 
accounting changes over time, but they give a feel for the changes that have taken 
place.  Inflation-adjusted spending in FY 1996 was about $1.4 billion, growing to nearly 
$1.8 billion in FY 2005 (see Figure 4). 
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Increased real spending in the health and human services system is driven by 
three forces that are beyond the state’s control and reliance on public resources is 
growing.  First, there is a demographic reality in terms of growth in the elderly 
population, both in absolute numbers and in terms of their percentage of the population.  
People are living longer and the baby boomers have just started to retire.  Second, 
proportionately fewer people are covered by private sector health insurance plans, and 
early retirees are losing their health insurance. Third, price inflation in healthcare is 
outpacing the general rise in consumer prices.  The effect of these three forces is 
displayed in Figure 5. 
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 Figure 5 
 
 
Health and human services spending in FY 1996, expressed in 2005 dollars, was 
$1.4 billion less than the amount that was spent in FY2005.  This accounts for 32.6 
percent of the real spending increase in the state budget. 
 
Total General Revenue Fund spending increased in inflation-adjusted terms by 
approximately $4.3 billion from FY 1996 to FY 2005.  The Department of Rehabilitation 
and Corrections accounted for about $400 million in this real increase.  Health and  
human services accounted for about $1.4 billion of the increase, and K-12 schooling  
increased by $2.3 billion.  These three spending areas account for 95 percent of the 
increase. 
 
However, not all of the components of the state’s budget increased during this 
time period.  Higher education spending remained nearly constant in inflation adjusted, 
real dollar terms, while serving more students.  Figure 6 shows that spending on higher 
education in FY 1996 was about $2 billion; expressing this figure in 2005 dollars brings 
it to $2.4 billion, which is the FY 2005 amount.   
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 Figure 6 
 
 
Representative William J. Seitz (R-Cincinnati) sent his analysis of the proposed 
Ohio TEL amendment to the Ohio Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the bipartisan 
Hamilton County legislative delegation, with the exception of Representative 
Brinkman.28   The Hamilton County delegation opposes the proposed amendment.  
Seitz noted that the state of Ohio employs 3,000 fewer workers than it did in FY 2001, 
about half of the state agencies operate on less money than they did in FY 2001, the  
state enacted a 21 percent across-the-board income tax cut in 2005, restructured 
business taxes; and that the growth in the budget in FY 2006 and 2007 are at all-time  
lows.  The delegation questions the necessity for the proposed amendment.  In the next 
section, we discuss a number of features of the proposed TEL amendment that raise 
fundamental public policy concerns.   
 
                                            
28 Seitz, letter to the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, copy, no date. 
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Questions About the Proposed Ohio TEL Amendment 
  
 This report aims to review and analyze the key provisions of the Tax Expenditure 
Limitation legislation proposed by Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. Throughout 
the course of the research, issues arose that can only be characterized as unanswered  
questions. Some are attributable to the varying opinions on the TEL, but most of them 
are a direct result of the ambiguous language contained in the TEL proposal.  
 
What is covered by the TEL? 
 
 The first major issue centers on determining what parts of Ohio’s state budget 
would be affected if a TEL were implemented.  Section 14(A) of the proposal reads: 
 
State Spending Limitation.  The general assembly shall not increase aggregate 
state expenditures for a fiscal year by an amount that exceeds the aggregate 
state expenditures for the previous fiscal year beyond the allowable rate…. 
 
Aggregate state expenditures are defined as “the sum of all state expenditures,” 
except that “aggregate state expenditures” shall not include expenditures of 
moneys (a) received from a revenue source other than taxes, licenses, permits, 
fees or sales, (b) received from the federal government, (c) for refunds of any 
kind, or (d) made pursuant to a bill that authorizes “temporary expenditures” for 
relief from an emergency. 
 
What is missing from this straightforward interpretation of the language in the 
TEL is a definition of what is the scope of state government. Section 14(F)(B) of the 
proposed amendment defines “state” to mean, “the state government including any 
branch, state office, authority, agency, board, commission, institution, instrumentality, or 
any other division or unit of state government which is directly supported with tax funds.” 
The definition of “state” in the TEL requires that the meaning of the apparently 
innocuous term “instrumentality” be defined. This definition does not exist in the 
proposal. Lawyers suggested that the definition exists in the Ohio Revised Code (ORC) 
Section 4115.31 Definitions: 
 
Instrumentality of the state means any board, commission, authority, public 
corporation, college, university, or other educational institution, or any other entity 
supported in whole or in part by funds appropriated by the general assembly. 
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 The combination of these three sets of definitions—state, instrumentality, and 
aggregate state expenditures—appears to require that a new, all-encompassing state 
budget be drawn up that incorporates the budgets of all of the instrumentalities of the 
state. Seeing that the TEL does not limit the revenues of state government but restricts 
the expenditures of the state, the legislature will have to set spending levels for all parts 
of the government currently covered by the General Revenue Fund Budget, the 
Homestead Tax Exemption, and the total spending of all state-supported universities 
and colleges (with the exception of federal grants but including all spending related to 
federal contracts), commissions, and authorities – including the Turnpike Authority – 
and public corporations that receive state funds. This is an aggressive definition 
resulting in an extremely complicated budget and a change the concept of an 
independent agency in the state of Ohio.  A question arises as to the impact of this 
definition for the fiduciary responsibility and legal liability of the directors of these 
organizations.  We did not investigate the impact on the independence of the state’s 
retirement systems or on the fiduciary responsibility of their boards. 
 
The House budget staff and the staff at the Center for Public Management at 
Cleveland State University, estimated the budget including the state’s General Revenue 
Fund less the Homestead Exemption property tax rollback and less federal funds that 
flow through the state budget.  This definition of revenues is an interpretation and not 
clearly stated in the proposal.  A major area of uncertainty is the property tax rollback 
(The Homestead Exemption).  The property tax rollback is an expenditure not a refund, 
so that it appears to be part of a state budget as defined by the TEL.  While it is clear 
that federal funds that flow through the state’s budget are exempt, state funds that are 
used to meet federal matching requirements are not exempt under a close reading of 
the language. 
 
 It is difficult to obtain reliable, replicable budget numbers on the possible impact 
of the TEL.  This is partially due to the fuzziness of the language and partially due to the  
fact that the state’s accounting system is not set up with the TEL in mind.  Because 
Ohio’s accounting system is not equipped to break down spending in the same manner 
that the TEL would, it is difficult to fully depict the impact of the proposal on the 
operations of the state of Ohio.  
 
What is an elector? 
 
 Section 14(A) states that the general assembly can go above the expenditure 
caps if it passes a specific bill and makes that bill subject to “a vote of affirmation by a 
majority of electors at the next statewide special, primary, or general election occurring 
more than 60 days after the filing of such bill with the secretary of state.  If a majority of 
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electors voting at such an election approves the bill, the bill shall take effect thirty days 
after the election.” 
 
 This language makes us ask: What is an “elector?”  The secretary of state’s 
website indicates that an elector is an enrolled voter and the language requires 
“affirmation by a majority of electors.”  More importantly, Article 5, Section 1 of the 
state’s constitution states:  
 
“Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen years, who has been a 
resident of the state, county, township, or ward, such time as may be provided by 
law, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, has the qualifications of an 
elector, and is entitled to vote at all elections.”  
 
And, the Ohio Revised Code 3503.01 on the age and residence, assignment of 
electors states:  
 
“Every citizen of the United States who is of the age of eighteen years or over 
and who has been a resident of the state thirty days immediately preceding the 
election at which the citizen offers to vote, is a resident of the county and precinct 
in which the citizen offers to vote, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, 
has the qualifications of an elector and may vote at all elections in the precinct in 
which the citizen resides.” 
 
 Section N then defines terms: 
 
“ ‘Elector’ or ‘qualified elector’ means a person having the qualifications provided 
by law to be entitled to vote.” 
 
If these passages define the term elector, then this provision means that a 
majority of enrolled voters is required to pass an increase in spending above the cap.  
However, the last sentence in Section 14(A) stipulates “if a majority of the electors 
voting at such an election approves the bill…” If this language holds, then the 
requirement is for a majority of those who vote in an election.  This issue comes around 
again in section 14(E) Tax and Spending Limits on Political Subdivisions which is 
discussed next.  
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What are the implications for local government? 
 
 Most of the public’s attention over the proposed TEL focuses on its impact on the 
expenditures of state government and overlooks its impact on the “political subdivisions” 
of the state.  The Ohio TEL’s proposed expenditure cap is sweeping in its impact on 
county and local governments in the state, as well as special districts and school 
districts.  The impact of the proposed TEL on local school districts is exceptionally 
murky due to the interaction that would occur between the TEL and House Bill 920,  
which governs special elections for local property tax levies.  This raises three 
questions: What units of government are covered?  What are the election 
requirements?  What is the impact on House Bill 920?  We only have a clear answer to 
the first question. 
 
What units of government are covered? 
  
Section 14(E)(1) states: “No political subdivision of the state shall (a) increase 
aggregate political subdivision expenditures for a fiscal year by an amount that exceeds 
the aggregate political subdivision expenditures for the previous fiscal year beyond the  
allowable rate for a political subdivision, (b) levy a new tax, or (c) increase the rate of an 
existing tax, without first obtaining the approval of a majority of electors in that political 
subdivision.” 
 
A political subdivision is defined as “any county, municipality, village, township, 
education district, library district, other special district, or other taxing district of the state 
which is directly supported by tax funds.” 
 
 The proposed constitutional amendment is clear: all political subdivisions of the 
state are covered as are all taxing district in the state.  This includes, counties, cities, 
villages, townships, school districts, and any other special district—port authorities, 
sewer and water districts, park districts, community colleges—that use the property tax 
or other tax source to fund their operations.   
 
Section 14(F)(1) defines “aggregate political subdivision expenditures,” as the 
sum of all expenditures, except for money received from both the state and federal 
governments.  It does not include “grants, gifts, donations, or bequests which are to be 
expended for purposes specified by the donor.”  And, “aggregate state expenditures” 
includes expenditures supported by “taxes, licenses, permits, fess, or sales” in section 
14(F)(2). 
 
What if the organization is a public corporation and is not supported by taxes but 
by fees and funds passed through the state budget?  Our reading of the proposal leads 
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us to think that if the special purpose public corporation does not have taxing power 
then it is not directly covered by the proposed amendment at the local level.  However, if 
they are determined to be an “instrumentality of the state,” their budget will be rolled up 
into the state budget and be subject to the TEL at the state level. This means that the  
actual budget will be set by the legislature. The organization will not have a direct TEL 
cap – its budget can rise and fall with the legislature’s wishes. However, the overall 
state TEL budget cannot exceed the TEL caps. 
 
 The experience in both Colorado and Washington State indicate that when 
extremely tough budget choices are made, higher education will be disproportionately 
cut.  However, ancillary revenues may not be covered by the proposed amendment.  
This interpretation is reinforced by section 14(F)(1), which states that money spent (d) 
“pursuant to an ordinance or resolution which … (v) receives the affirmative vote of not 
less than three-fifths of the members of the legislative authority of that political 
subdivision.”  Special purpose public corporations are not legislatures; they are 
corporations.  We note below that this interpretation is not shared by Policy Matters 
Ohio and Policy Matters thinks that ancillary income will be covered, as was the 
experience in Colorado.  This difference in interpretation is an example of the difficulty 
in understanding the proposal. 
 
The proposed amendment does present challenges to special districts with 
taxing authority.  First, the amendment assumes that the authority is in existence and 
has a budget that serves as a base for the expenditure cap.  The proposal does contain  
section 14(E)(2), which allows for annexation, the creation of new political subdivisions, 
geographic consolidations, or changes in boundaries.  This section states that the “total 
costs are not increased as a result of annexation, creation, consolidation or change in 
boundaries.”  This section further states that the expenditure limitation goes into effect  
with “the fiscal year immediately following the annexation, creation of a new political 
subdivision, or consolidation or change in the boundaries of a political subdivision.”    
Therefore, the amendment assumes that the service is already being delivered and that 
if a new authority is put into place, the cost associated with the service delivery is spun 
into the new organization.  This assumption will prove to be problematic in rural 
jurisdictions that are urbanizing when demand for sewer and water authorities, park 
districts, and possibly new specialized school or health districts arise. 
 
A second problem will arise for special districts that must respond to unfunded 
federal mandates.  The amendment forbids unfunded mandates being passed from the 
state to its political subdivisions.  It does not anticipate unfunded mandates from the 
courts or federal government being passed to county or local governments.  A good 
example lies with the federal U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA).  The US 
EPA is involved in vigorous rulemaking around clean water.  The agency is pressing for 
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aggressive investments to separate stormwater runoff from sanitary wastewater.  The 
EPA is also tightening rules related to surface water runoff that can end up in Lake Erie 
and the Ohio River and is tightening water quality standards.  None of these activities is 
being funded by the federal government.  Yet all of the bonds that will have to be sold to 
respond to these mandates will have to be repaid with tax or fee money subject to the 
proposed amendment. 
 
A third problem awaits port authorities that float revenue bonds to pay for port-
related infrastructure, waterfront investments to change the character of Ohio’s 
waterfront cities, or to support economic development activities.  Bond repayments 
come from revenues generated from the beneficiaries of the bond.  These revenues can 
take the form of a rent payment, be done through a Tax Increment Financing District, or 
may come from a payment made in lieu of taxes (i.e. a fee).  All of these forms of 
payment may be classified as an aggregate expenditure and subject to the formula cap.  
Port authorities that receive revenue from county property taxes will also face 
restrictions from that source of funding. If the port authority receives funds from the 
state, then it becomes an instrumentality of the state. 
 
Finally, community colleges will be restricted in responding to local service 
demands.  At present only six counties in the state of Ohio fund a portion of the 
operation of their community colleges through the property tax.  The proposed Ohio TEL 
amendment will make it much more difficult for the other counties to support their 
educational activities through that revenue source.  However, because community 
colleges are an instrumentality their budgets will have to be established by the 
legislature. It is unclear if they get to retain their revenue sources or if their revenues 
become part of the state budget. Of course, this will mean increased pressure on the 
state budget and a loss of local autonomy and weakened home rule. 
 
What are the election requirements for local government? 
 
The confusion over the definition of an elector is discussed above.  At the local 
level, the definition of an elector is crucial to the exercise of local democracy and fiscal 
stability. Section 14(E)(1) clearly states that no political subdivision can exceed the TEL 
cap “without first obtaining the approval of a majority of electors in that political 
subdivision.” The language used in 14(A)(3) on statewide issues that requires “a 
majority of electors voting” is missing. If the word “electors” enrolled voters, then the 
language is clear: the political subdivision of the state can only exceed the TEL-
improved spending caps with the vote of the majority of enrolled voters, not of a majority  
of those voting. 
 
Table 9 below contains data from 2000 to 2005 illustrating the practical 
 A Review of Tax Expenditure Limitations 
and their Impact on State & Local Government in Ohio 
 
 
 
The Center for Public Management   58
importance of how an elector is defined.  The top half of the table contains election data 
for the state of Ohio and its seven most populous counties.  The pattern is 
unmistakable; voter turnout is highest in presidential election years (2000 and 2004), 
next highest in the even numbered non-presidential election years when Ohioans go to 
the polls to elect their governor and federal legislative representatives, and lowest in the 
odd-numbered years when local issues dominate.  What is critical is to note that turnout  
exceeds 50 percent of the electors (those enrolled to vote) only in presidential election 
years.   
 
The state’s most populous counties exhibit the same pattern as the state as a 
whole.  However, the pattern is more pronounced in Franklin County, where the odd-
year elections turnout less than 30 percent of enrolled voters.  This is most likely due to 
the large number of student and transient voters who live in Franklin County.  They are 
motivated to vote in the presidential election but skip the local races. 
 
The point is that if it takes a majority of those enrolled to vote to pass a new tax 
or to adjust a local expenditure cap then the only elections where this can take place is 
during a presidential election, and the chance of passage by a majority of registered 
voters is slim. 
 
The lower portion of Table 9 contains voter turnout records for the 2003-2005 
elections for a selection of municipalities in Cuyahoga County.  They were selected for 
geographic and socio-economic diversity (the records for 2000 to 2002 were not 
available).  The pattern is the same; only Parma and Strongsville came close to having 
a majority of their enrolled voters vote in an off-year election.  How the word elector is  
defined is critical to the fiscal future of local government under the proposed 
amendment. 
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Table 9 
 
How does local school funding operate? 
 
The proposed TEL Amendment’s impact on K-12 education is far from clear.  
The legislature retains its ability to shift funds in the GRF under the TEL cap.  If the 
legislature wants to spend more on K-12 education and shift from other types of 
spending, as has happened in Colorado, it is free to do so.  However, section 14(E)(1) 
limits the growth in own-source (local property taxes and fees) financed school 
expenditures  (fees) within local districts under the TEL formula.  This would put districts 
that are not spending at capacity or are due to renew their levies soon after the TEL is 
enacted at a fiscal disadvantage, because they will be operating from a low initial  
expenditure base. 
Election Turnout for the State of Ohio and Ohio's Seven Largest Counties
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
State 40.3 71.8 36.6 47.8 36.0 63.7
Cuyahoga 36.1 68.3 32.4 45.9 37.4 58.1
Franklin 29.6 63.1 25.6 40.4 22.8 61.3
Hamilton 35.9 75.5 34.0 47.4 37.1 65.6
Lucas 42.8 74.0 35.4 48.7 42.6 62.4
Montgomery 40.1 73.4 33.8 50.0 31.3 63.9
Stark 41.5 71.6 38.4 47.9 38.9 67.7
Summit 38.9 76.4 39.7 49.9 39.7 65.6
source: Ohio Secretary of State, Election Results, January 11, 2006
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/ElectionsVoter/electionResutls.aspx
Election Turnout for Cuyahoga County and Select Municipalities
Year 2005 2004 2003
Cuyahoga County 36.1 68.2 32.9
Bay Village 48.8 64.9 46.8
Beachwood 38.3 55.6 19.7
Cleveland 31.3 53.1 nd
Euclid 36.4 59.8 41.3
Lakewood 28.6 59.8 46.1
Parma 41.5 65.2 49.1
Solon 46.1 66.7 nd
Strongsville 38.1 64.5 53.1
nd no data available at the municipal level
source: Cuyahoga County, Board of Elections, January 11, 2006
http://boe.cuyahogacounty.us/BOE/results/history.htm
Election turnout: votes cast divided by registered voters, or registered electors
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Another serious concern is the interaction of the TEL with House Bill 920.  House 
Bill 920 is the property tax limitation measure that was discussed earlier.  Property tax 
revenue collected under HB 920 declines in real, inflation-adjusted value over time as 
school districts periodically go to the voters for levy approvals.  The combination of HB 
920 and the proposed TEL could send school districts to the ballot box more frequently 
to keep their spending base closer to the TEL limit, or they can watch their funding base 
decline.  The TEL is a formula for either annual levy campaigns for local school districts 
or for long-term degradation in school funding through a slow and steady ratcheting 
down of local fiscal resources for K-12 education.  It is designed in such a way that the 
downward ratchet will not be immediately apparent.  It could take a decade for its 
corrosive effects to be noticed by the average resident or voter.  The TEL will make it 
more difficult for communities to willingly invest in their schools and students.  “Frills,” 
such as Advanced Placement classes and writing coaches, will be among the first set of 
savings taken from the schools. 
 
More disconcerting is the apparent requirement that school levies will have to 
pass by a majority of electors.  Districts have enough trouble getting majorities of those 
voting. They will not be able to get a majority of the enrolled voters with anything short 
of the most dire fiscal emergency. School bands and sports teams will be taken hostage 
across the Buckeye state with increased frequency. 
 
How does the change in state business taxes effect schools under the TEL? 
 
 The state of Ohio allows local schools to collect a large portion of the Tangible 
Personal Property Tax (TPPT) to fund local operations. Under business tax reform, the 
Corporate Franchise Tax and TPPT are being phased out over five years and replaced 
with the Corporate Activities Tax (CAT). The TPPT funds received by local school 
districts are to be replaced by formula from the state’s General Revenue Fund. Because 
the TEL would be binding before this transfer in school funding takes place, that state 
budget and local school budgets can be thrown into disarray, largely due to accounting. 
 
 The TPPT and local funding are currently not part of the state budget. However, 
when the TPPT phases out and the CAT is phased in, the source of spending changes 
from the local school budget to the state’s budget. This switch in funding will result in an 
accounting-driven increase in the state budget that will fall prey to the TEL and trigger 
major shifts in state spending patterns. If schools are held harmless, then other parts of 
the state budget will suffer major cutbacks. 
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How does the TEL formula work for local governments? 
 
 The application of the TEL formula to local governments is spelled out in section 
14(F)(4).  The inflation rate will remain the Consumer Price Index for all urban 
consumers in the Midwest region and the population growth rate will be the estimates 
provided by the US Bureau of the Census.  If a growth rate is not available for the 
political subdivision, then the rate for the county that contains the unit of government will  
be used.  There will be some benefit to slow-growing or declining parts of counties and 
a small cost to the more rapidly growing portions.  However, slow-growing counties will  
most likely prefer the lighter yoke of the 3.5 percent growth factor and opt out of the 
formula cap. 
 
How will the local government fund operate? 
 
 Another unanswered question surrounds the issue of local government funding. 
Section 14(D) appears to enhance the state’s local government fund.  This section 
pledges that annual support of “not less than five percent of the aggregate state 
expenditures for the preceding fiscal year shall be appropriated to the local government 
fund by the general assembly.”  The purpose is to provide “a minimum level of state 
funding to political subdivisions.”  The proposed amendment also promises not to enact 
any unfunded mandates in section 14(C).  
 
At first blush the language is clear: at least five percent of the state’s aggregate 
expenditures flow to local government—it is assumed by most that this means cities, 
townships, and villages.  However, the proposal goes on to say that these moneys are 
to flow through the county budgets (if it is a pass through from the state, it does not 
affect the county’s TEL cap).  Each county will receive a “proportional” amount, where 
proportional is not defined but we assume that it means a per capita allocation; 
however, the exact formula is up to the legislature to define.  Each county is then to 
“distribute its proportional share of those monies to one or more, but not necessarily all, 
of the political subdivisions in that county, in accordance with legislation enacted by the 
general assembly.” There will be a great deal of uncertainty in how the legislature 
operationalizes the county allocation process and another bout of uncertainty as county 
commissioners engage in their rule making.  It is our interpretation that county 
commissioners will have to decide which local political subdivisions gain access to the 
local government funds.  This includes all local governments and special districts that 
currently have access to the property tax. In Cuyahoga County’s case, this includes 
cities, villages and townships along with the community college library system, the 
Metroparks, and possibly the Regional Transit Authority, sewer and water authorities, 
and K-12 school systems. Fee for service organizations would be exempt. 
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There are a large number of uncertainties in the proposal.  The proposal refers to 
the local government fund, which has been traditionally restricted to municipalities, 
townships, and villages.  However, the proposal also refers to “funding local political 
subdivisions.”  As noted above, a local political subdivision is defined in the proposed 
amendment to include “educational district, library district, other special district, or other 
taxing district of the state which is directly supported by tax funds.”  Does this now mean  
that K-12 educational spending will count as part of the five percent local government 
set aside?  Does it mean that this broader list of local governments has access to the  
state’s Local Government Fund?  Or does it mean they have access to these funds in 
the county’s disbursement formula? 
 
Is this five percent of the total budget, five percent of the TEL budget (state-only 
GRF minus property tax relief), some combination of both, or none of the above? The 
Ohio TEL proposal is not clear on the source of the money for local governments. 
Further, it is not clear what exactly the five percent will consist of. Is the proposal 
referring specifically to the Local Government Fund, which is funded annually at a rate  
of 4.2 percent of the state’s sales tax, use tax, personal income tax, public utility tax, 
and corporate franchise tax? If this is the case, then the TEL proposal includes a 
significant increase in local funding. Or, does the proposal refer to all or some 
combination of local government spending (e.g. the local government fund, local debt 
service support for indigent defendants and K-12 funding)? If the proposal ensures five 
percent for all local government support, then it represents a significantly lower baseline 
of spending than exists currently.  
 
How will the Rainy Day Fund operate? 
 
 Section 14(B) establishes a budget reserve fund, or rainy day fund, and makes 
provision to rebate money from the fund back to state income taxpayers if certain 
provisions are met.  The section reads in part: 
 
Moneys in the budget reserve fund may be expended for any lawful purpose, 
provided that, if at any time the amount of moneys in or accrued to the budget 
reserve fund exceeds 15 percent of the aggregate state expenditures for the 
preceding fiscal year, the excess moneys shall be refunded to the taxpayers… 
 
The Ohio TEL proposal places any unspent revenue, up to 15 percent over the 
budget, into the budget reserve fund.  If there is a surplus at the end of a budget year, 
money flows into the rainy day fund.  Half of all unencumbered money in the GRF plus 
all unencumbered state funds outside of the GRF will be transferred into the rainy day 
fund (the other half must be rebated to individual state income-tax taxpayers by an  
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unspecified formula).  The amendment also allows the legislature to make 
appropriations into the rainy day fund.  Section 14(B)(3) states that when the fund’s 
balance is more than 15 percent of the previous year’s aggregate state expenditures, 
the surplus is to be distributed to state income taxpayers by formula.29  
 
What is not clear is under what circumstances and to what degree the rainy day 
fund would be utilized.  There is also an assumption in the proposal that the legislature 
will not spend down the fund during good times by declaring a tax refund before the  
rainy day fund is fully funded. The proposed TEL does not define the conditions under 
which the rainy day fund would be used to supplement declining revenues, nor does it 
outline whether or not the fund would be exhausted before resorting to other revenue-
enhancing measures. The CFTR was mindful of TABOR’s shortcomings when 
introducing a budget stabilization fund into Ohio’s TEL, but they fell short in illustrating 
when and how it would be used.  Our reading of the amendment indicates that the  
budget reserve fund is to be used if there is a revenue shortfall in meeting a state 
budget that complies with the previous year’s TEL cap and that the legislature has 
discretion in this matter.  Spending from the rainy day fund may also be budgeted into a 
forthcoming budget as long as that budget complies with the TEL formula. 
 
Is this a gateway to unchecked litigation? 
 
 The proposed constitutional amendment has two extremely disturbing features 
for a piece of legal writing that will require substantial interpretation by the courts.  
Section 14(G)(6) states that taxpayers or classes of taxpayers have a standing right to 
sue to compel compliance, and that they can recover costs and reasonable attorney 
fees.  To make sure that the legal incentive structure is uneven, the state or political 
subdivision that is sued cannot be awarded its costs or legal fees unless the suit is 
deemed to be frivolous.   
 
We have outlined a large number of issues that need to be defined under our 
interpretation of the proposed amendment; each raises the potential for litigation.  
Clause 14(G)(6) is irresponsible due to the poor drafting of the proposed Amendment. 
Our concern is highlighted when Section 14(G)(1) is read, which instructs that the 
“provisions of this section [of the constitution] shall be liberally construed for the purpose 
of effectuating the purposes thereof…” The enabling language in the proposal also 
contains a supremacy clause.  Section 14(G)(4) holds that in the case of a conflict 
between existing law and existing portions of the constitution, the provisions of the 
proposed constitutional amendment controls.  This clause is a portal to the Law of 
                                            
29 The TEL proposal does not allow for the rebates to go to business and commercial taxpayers, which 
will raise equal treatment questions if a rebate ever takes place. 
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Unintended Consequences. 
 
 The proposed TEL amendment of Ohio’s constitution is poor public policy. A sign 
of a well thought out piece of legislation is one that analysts can estimate what the 
impacts of the law will be. Analysts may not be able to estimate impacts down to the 
penny, but should at least be able to indicate the general direction and scope of the 
impacts. The TEL is so poorly drafted that this is impossible. 
 
The Secretary of State has dual and competing roles as both the sponsor of this 
ballot issue and as the Chief Elections Officer of the state of Ohio.  His role as the 
initiator of the TEL Amendment should not prevent the Secretary acting in his role as 
the state’s Chief Elections Officer and in acting on behalf of the citizens of Ohio.  In his 
current capacity as Secretary of State there is a responsibility to clarify the ballot 
language that would allow Ohio’s voters/electors to understand the intent and 
implication of the constitutional ballot issue.  This has not been done. 
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Interest Group Reaction 
 
Interest groups and public policy organizations in Ohio have taken opposing 
views on what a TEL would mean for Ohio. At the forefront of the policy debate is the 
Buckeye Institute, which favors the TEL and the Coalition for Ohio’s Future and The 
Center for Community Solutions, who oppose the TEL proposal.  
  
In December of 2004, the Buckeye Institute, in conjunction with the 
Independence Institute, issued a policy paper titled Should Ohio Limit Government 
Spending and Taxes? The report contended that Ohio has evolved from a state with 
one of the nation’s lowest tax burdens to a state with one of the highest, making Ohio 
an unattractive place for families and preventing the creation of thousands of jobs. As 
evidence, the Institute points to the fact that Ohio’s tax burden has consistently 
exceeded the national average, and that since 1994 personal income growth in the 
state has lagged the rest of the nation. Further, the Buckeye Institute cites Richard 
Vedder’s estimate that a one percentage point increase in the state personal income tax 
is associated with economic growth falling by 3.5 percent as evidence that tax increases 
are correlated to declining economic conditions. The authors contend that this has 
occurred under the watch of Ohio’s legislators, as they have been unable to restrain 
spending, citing a nominal state spending increase of 63.4 percent since 1994.  
 
The Buckeye Institute supports a Tax and Expenditure Limit (TEL) as a possible 
solution to the problem of high taxes and unrestrained spending by government. It notes 
that there are currently dozens of TELs in place, but the effective ones have three 
provisions: (1) the TEL is part of the constitution and limits are not amended without 
approval of voters, (2) state spending and revenue growth are limited to inflation plus 
population growth, and (3) surpluses are automatically directed to a rainy day fund or, 
over a certain threshold, refunded to taxpayers. The original TEL proposed in Ohio by 
CFTR and Secretary of State Blackwell contains many of the features recommended by 
the Buckeye Institute.  
 
The Buckeye Institute then makes its case for TELs as a means of fiscal  
discipline at the state level. TELs determine the rate of increase of taxes, expenditures, 
or both. These limits create hard budget constraints for state policymakers to work 
within. According to the Institute, these hard constraints do not interfere with the 
legislature’s ability to set priorities and fund specific programs and agencies.  
 
The Buckeye Institute then makes a case for what it terms as “the next 
generation TEL.” These TELs are expected to be more effective in addressing the  
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tradeoff between supporting state finances and restraining government growth. To  
achieve both goals, the Institute suggests that a next-generation TEL must introduce an 
effective limit on the revenue government can spend, determine the base of the TEL, 
and govern how the surplus revenue above the TEL limit is allocated or disbursed to the 
budget stabilization fund. To do this, the Buckeye Institute recommends defining the 
TEL limit as the sum of the inflation rate and population growth rate. Further, the 
Institute recommended linking the TEL to a budget stabilization fund. In this situation, a 
portion of the surplus is accumulated in a budget stabilization fund to be used when 
revenues fall short during a recession. Finally, the authors estimate the savings that 
Ohio would have enjoyed had a TEL been in place from 1996 to 2002. They contend 
that spending in Ohio would have been $9 billion lower in 2002, and the cumulative 
savings would have been between $22 and $24 billion from 1996 to 2002. The authors 
then project that if a TEL had been put in place in 2005, the savings over the next 10 
years would equal $79 billion. Nowhere in the analysis do the authors attempt to 
demonstrate what this savings would mean in terms of services that the state would not 
have provided or when decreases would or should have taken place within the budget. 
These estimates are also much higher than those presented in this report. 
 
In contrast to the Buckeye Institute, the Center for Community Solutions and the 
Coalition for Ohio’s Future make a case for keeping a TEL out of Ohio’s fiscal 
landscape. The Coalition for Ohio’s Future is a bi-partisan organization made up of 
more than 125 groups dedicated to the defeat of the TEL proposal. Its position is that a 
TEL amendment would “introduce a faulty system that could wreak havoc at the state 
and local levels of government.” They suggest that TELs are gimmicks that force 
governments into rigid budgetary requirements that ultimately are detrimental to the 
residents of the state. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, working in 
conjunction with the Center for Community Solutions, published a report entitled A State 
of Decline: What a TABOR would mean for Ohio in April 2005. This report compares 
Ohio’s budget and the Ohio TEL proposal to a Colorado-style TEL (which is significantly 
more restrictive than the proposal in Ohio). This report provides commentary on the 
types of spending cuts that would need to be made if a TEL were implemented. The 
authors found that if a TABOR were in place in Ohio, a total of $19 billion would have 
been trimmed from the budget from 1995 to 2004. Again, this estimate is higher than 
the one presented here.   One reason for the difference is in the years covered by the 
estimates.  
 
John Corlett, a Senior Fellow and Director of Public Policy at the Center for 
Community Solutions, produced a comparative report in January 2005 that examined 
the state of Colorado to the state of Ohio. In each category that Corlett identified 
(education, healthcare, support for children, and human services spending) Ohio  
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outpaced Colorado in spending. This examination was intended to demonstrate that 
Ohio should not follow Colorado down the path to a TABOR because of the deep pool  
of services that are provided by the state of Ohio. The differences in Corlett’s estimates 
and those used in this report are primarily due to the time the work was conducted. The 
work of the two research centers was based on an earlier version of the Ohio TEL 
proposal that was nearly identical to Colorado’s TABOR. Our work is based on an 
improved, more flexible version of the TEL. This is the version that has been certified by 
the Attorney General for the voters. 
 
Policy Matters Ohio is also critical of the proposed TEL amendment, citing in its 
July 2005 report that the TEL would generate substantial lawsuits due to the 
amendment’s ambiguous provisions. Authored by Research Analyst Dr. Jon Honeck, 
Flawed by Design: A Review of the Proposed Tax and Expenditure Limitation 
Amendment, finds several structural problems within the TEL amendment. Primarily, 
Honeck notes that the TEL’s supremacy clause ensures that the TEL would prevail in 
the event of conflict with any other section of the state’s constitution. The TEL language 
mandates that unencumbered funds be collected each year, thus posing potential 
conflicts with sections of the constitution that restrict the use of fuel taxes and workers’ 
compensation funds. The report finds that the TEL imposes an overall cap on state 
spending and a separate spending cap on local governments, for tax revenues and also 
for revenues raised from certain voluntary transactions such as lottery ticket sales. 
Honeck’s interpretation of the proposed amendment finds that large portions of public 
university spending may be subject to the spending cap, such as tuition, fees, and ticket 
sales to sports and entertainment events. Honeck’s report states that the TEL’s 
requirement that the state pay for “mandates” on political subdivisions fails to define the 
term “mandates,” thus leaving an open interpretation that may lead to litigation. The 
report notes that this would overturn the established relationship between the state and 
its political subdivisions because political subdivisions may then be able to object to 
state laws passed to comply with federal mandates. 
 
Honeck’s report raises further objections to the proposed TEL amendment, 
stating that the tax refund mechanism of the TEL would pool revenue from various fees 
and taxes and give it to individuals who paid the income tax. Individuals or businesses 
that paid a fee for a specific program or license may see little of this refund. The report 
also notes that by using a pro rata method for tax refunds, the TEL would direct the bulk 
of the tax relief to the wealthy rather than to the low income individuals who pay more in 
sales and excise taxes each year than income taxes. Other objections of the TEL noted 
in the report are that the TEL does not specify how to implement the spending cap 
formula in school districts and other taxing districts that cross political boundaries, and  
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that both the state and local spending limits cover capital expenditures even though 
voters have already authorized general obligation bonds for these expenditures. 
 
Coupled with the Center for Community Solutions are some state lawmakers who 
view TELs as an obstacle that limits the state’s ability to set strategic policy initiatives 
and to respond to funding priorities. The Ohio House of Representatives issued a paper 
in January 2005 noting that if a Colorado-style TEL had been in place since 1997, the 
state would have spent $19 billion less. In order to accommodate this significant 
decrease in state spending, dramatic budget cuts would have been necessary. The 
Ohio House of Representatives Chief of Staff recently speculated that in such a tight 
budgetary environment, little funding would be available for anything beyond Medicaid 
and correctional facilities. 
 
Ohio’s CAP Proposal 
 
 In the wake of Colorado’s vote allowing the state to retain the TABOR surplus, 
Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro advanced his own version of legislated fiscal restraint. 
Petro’s proposal, the Citizens’ Amendment for Prosperity (CAP), would cap taxes at 5.5 
percent of the total personal income earned in the state, thus limiting state revenues to 
a fixed percentage  of personal income annually. The CAP would also require the state 
to maintain a budget stabilization fund (rainy day fund) during times of economic growth. 
The rainy day fund will be capped at five percent of that year’s general revenue fund. If 
the fund exceeds its limit, the surplus will be rebated in the form of income tax credits. If 
tax revenues exceed the cap by more than 2.5 percent, the overage will also be rebated 
with income tax credits. In both cases, each taxpayer would have an equal percentage 
credit to apply to their income taxes. Finally, the Ohio CAP deviates from the Ohio TEL 
in that it exempts local governments from CAP restrictions.  
 
 Ohio’s CAP is modeled after the Headlee Amendment in Michigan, but it places 
tighter restraints on the total amount of revenue the state can collect. Where Michigan 
caps revenues at 9.49 percent, the CAP places a 5.5 percent restriction on revenues. 
Attorney General Petro noted that the legislature would place the CAP on the November 
2006 ballot. If the legislature decides against placing it on the ballot, Petro has indicated 
that he will attempt to gather enough signatures to place it through the referendum 
process.  
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State Expenditure Limitations as of 2005 
 
State Expenditure Limitations - 2005 
State Year 
Constitutional 
or Statutory 
Type of 
Limitation Components of Limitation 
Arizona 1978 Constitutional Expenditure 
State spending cannot exceed 7.41 percent of the state's 
total personal income. 
Delaware 1978 Constitutional Appropriations 
State appropriations cannot exceed 98 percent of 
revenue estimates.  
Hawaii 1978 Constitutional Expenditure 
State general fund spending must be lower than the 
average growth in personal income for the previous three 
years. 
Michigan 1978 Constitutional Revenue 
State revenues cannot grow more than one percent over 
9.49 percent of the past year's personal income. 
Tennessee 1978 Constitutional Expenditure 
State expenditures are limited to the growth in personal 
income. 
Texas 1978 Constitutional Expenditure Appropriations are limited to growth in personal income. 
California 1979 Constitutional Expenditure 
Annual growth is capped by the growth in population and 
personal income. 
Nevada 1979 Statutory Expenditure 
Spending is limited to biennial growth in state population 
and inflation. 
Idaho 1980 Statutory Expenditure 
General fund appropriations are limited to 5.33 percent 
of estimated state personal income. The provision 
excludes one-time expenditures.  
Missouri 1980 Constitutional Revenue 
State revenues are limited to 5.64 percent of the 
previous year's personal income. 
South 
Carolina 
1980 & 
1984 Constitutional Expenditure 
Growth in expenditures is limited to either: a) growth in 
personal income or b) 9.5 percent of state personal 
income, whichever is larger. The provision further limits 
the total number of state employees in SC to the ratio of 
employees to total population. 
Montana 1981 Statutory Expenditure 
Expenditures are limited to a state personal income 
growth index. 
Alaska 1982 Constitutional Expenditure 
The state limits appropriation growth annually to the 
increase in population and inflation. 
Mississippi 1982 Statutory Appropriations 
State appropriations are limited to 98 percent of revenue 
estimations. This limit can only be amended by a 
majority vote of the legislature. 
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State Expenditure Limitations – 2005 (continued) 
State Year 
Constitutional 
or Statutory 
Type of 
Limitation Components of Limitation 
Oklahoma 
1985 
(2) Constitutional 
Expenditure and 
Appropriations 
Spending is limited to 12 percent of annual inflation-
adjusted growth. Further, the state limits 
appropriations to 95 percent of revenues. 
Massachusetts 1986 Statutory Revenue 
State revenues may not exceed average growth of 
state wages and salaries for the previous three years. 
Missouri 
1986 & 
1996 Constitutional Revenue 
Voters added to the state's existing revenue limitation 
in 1996, by requiring voter approval for any tax 
increase over $77 million or one percent of state 
revenues, whichever is less. 
Utah 1989 Statutory Expenditure 
Expenditure growth is capped through the use of a 
formula including growth in inflation and population. 
New Jersey 1990 Statutory Expenditure Spending is limited to growth in personal income. 
Colorado 1991 Statutory Expenditure 
General fund appropriations are limited to the lower of 
five percent of personal income or six percent of the 
previous year's appropriations. Although this statutory 
limitation remains in place, it has not been utilized 
since TABOR was inserted into the state constitution. 
Connecticut 1991 Statutory Expenditure 
State spending is limited to the larger of either the 
average growth in personal income over the previous 
five years or the previous year's inflation. 
North Carolina 1991 Statutory Expenditure 
Expenditures are limited to seven percent or less of 
personal income in state. 
Connecticut 1992 Constitutional Expenditure 
Following the statutory provision in 1991, voters in the 
state approved an additional limit. However, it has yet 
to receive a 3/5 vote in the state legislature. 
Iowa 1992 Statutory Appropriations 
The state limits appropriations to 99 percent of the 
revenue estimation. 
Rhode Island 1992 Constitutional Appropriations 
The state limits appropriations to 98 percent of 
projected revenues. 
Colorado 1992 Constitutional 
Revenue & 
Expenditure 
Revenues are limited to combination of population 
growth plus inflation. Any changes in expenditures 
must be approved by state voters.  
Louisiana 1993 Constitutional Expenditure 
Spending is limited to 1992 spending levels plus 
annual personal income growth in the state. 
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State Expenditure Limitations – 2005 (continued) 
State Year 
Constitutional 
or Statutory 
Type of 
Limitation Components of Limitation 
Washington 1993 Statutory Expenditure 
Expenditures are limited to inflation averages over the 
previous three years, plus the growth in population. 
Florida 1994 Constitutional Revenue 
Florida may only collect taxes equal to the mean 
growth rate over the past five years. 
Oregon 2000 Constitutional Revenue 
The state provides refunds to taxpayers any time 
general fund revenues exceed two percent of the 
project revenue estimate. 
Oregon 2001 Statutory Expenditure 
Growth in appropriations is limited to eight percent of 
projected personal income. 
Wisconsin 2001 Statutory Expenditure 
Qualified appropriations (some exempted) are limited 
to the annual growth in personal income. 
Indiana 2002 Statutory Expenditure 
The state caps expenditures annually to a formula for 
growth. 
Massachusetts 2002 Statutory Revenue 
Amended 1986 provision - allows for growth of 
revenues equal to inflation in government purchasing 
plus two percent. 
Maine 2005 Statutory Expenditure 
Spending growth is restricted to the 10-year average of 
growth in personal income or 2.75 percent, whichever 
is higher.  
Source: Mandy Rafool. "State Tax and Expenditure Limits - 2005", National Conference of State Legislators 
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